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Take My Child, Please-A Plea For
Radical Nonintervention
WILLIAM M. MARTICORENA*
INTRODUCTION
It is often said that children are our nation's most valuable as-
set. In order to protect those "assets," various levels of govern-
ment have created a juvenile justice system, separate from the
criminal justice system, to care for the needs of youthful offend-
ers. It was envisioned that such a system could best serve our na-
tion's youth by providing them with treatment as opposed to
punishment in an attempt to rehabilitate them. Its creators
hoped that this sytem could be utilized to combat our children's
most serious enemies: crime, poverty and neglect. Unfortunately,
despite good intentions, the juvenile justice system has been
transformed into one of our children's most vicious enemies.
A commonly-stated goal of the juvenile justice system is to care
for and rehabilitate juveniles. State intervention is justified on a
parens patriae theory in place of one based upon moral blame-
worthiness. Because of this theory, the juvenile justice system in-
* B.A., Loyola University of Los Angeles, 1974; J.D. Harvard University, 1977;
Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, 1978 to date; Associate
with Rutan and Tucker, Santa Ana, California, 1977 to date. The author wishes to
acknowledge Raymond Karch, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School, class of 1978, for
his invaluable assistance during the early stages of the preparation of this article.
trudes in a child's life where the criminal justice system would
dare not or could not go for due process reasons. The most signif-
icant aspect of this intrusion is the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over "status offenders."
Status offenders are children who have committed an act that if
committed by an adult would not constitute a crime. However,
they have engaged in conduct which is disfavored by society, such
as misbehavior, truancy, or sexual promiscuity and, thus, they fall
under this special jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Juvenile
court jurisdiction, at least as to these children, is clearly based
upon rehabilitative, protective, and supervisory principles.1
Some commentators have advanced the notion that the juvenile
justice system has dual goals: care and punishment. The punish-
ment feature (which most probably includes an element of deter-
ance) is clearly applicable to non-status offender juveniles since
they have engaged in criminal conduct. Even those who most vig-
orously defend the status offender jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, however, concede that one cannot justify its existence on a
punishment or deterrent theory. 2
The specific structure and operation of the juvenile justice the-
ory varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and state to state.
Their differences are relatively unimportant to the major thrust of
this paper for generally, they possess a common, overriding char-
acteristic: all allow judges discretion to intervene in the lives of
juvenile status offenders. It is this aspect of the system which
most needs criticism.
Generally, children coming under the jurisdiction of juvenile
courts because of delinquent conduct may be classified into two
1. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 119 N.W. 2d 111, 119 (1972); In re Walker, 282
N.C. 28, 39-40, 191 S.E.2d 702, 709-10 (1972).
We have already observed the purpose of juvenile proceedings is to help
and assist the child, not to punish. The constitutional safeguard of 'funda-
mental fairness' must be preserved in that setting. However, where there
is no public offense charges, we believe the requirement of advising the
juvenile and his parents of his right to remain silent would frustrate the
very purpose of the juvenile proceeding....
Henderson, supra at 119.
The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is not for the punishment of offend-
ers but for the salvation of children. The Act treats delinquent children
not as criminals, but as wards, and undertakes. . . to give them the control
and environment that may lead to their reformation, and enable them to
become law-abiding and useful citizens, a support and not a hinderance to
the commonwealth (citation omitted). The state must exercise its power
as parens patriae to protect and provide for the comfort and well-being of
such of its citizens as by reason of infancy... are unable to take care of
themselves (citation omitted). Thus juveniles are in need of supervision
and control due to their inability to protect themselves.
Walker, supra, at 709-10.
2. See 19 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, 477, 483 (1973).
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categories. First, there are those who have committed acts which
would be crimes if committed by adults, and second, there are
those who have not been convicted of such offenses. 3 The second
group may be further divided into two categories, consisting of
children who have violated specific ordinances that only apply to
children, such as truancy, curfew, alcohol and tobacco ordinances,
and those who have broken no law but who are designated as "be-
yond control," "incorrigible," "runaway," "persons in need of su-
pervision (PINS)," or "minors in need of supervision (MINS),"
depending upon the jurisdiction.4
The omnibus clauses indicated above represent attempts by the
legislature to reach children who are likely to become delinquent
because they are presently leading lives of idleness or are in dan-
ger of becoming "morally depraved."5 Of the approximately
600,000 children held each year in secure detention pending a
court hearing, more than one-third are status offenders.6 The Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) recently esti-
mated that "before, during, and after the adjudication process,
one-half of juvenile noncriminal status offenders spend time in a
detention center. In addition, a large number of status offenders
are either detained or sentenced to serve time in city or county
jails."'7 Reports of abuse, rape, and suicide do not deter juvenile
court judges from placing juveniles in jails that are more punitive
and harmful for them comparatively than for adults.8
Of the 85,000 children committed to correctional institutions
each year, twenty-three percent of the boys and seventy percent
3. See Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correction
System? 31 FED. PROBATION 26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Why Treat?].
4. Id. In all but a few jurisdictions, the same dispositions are permitted in
the case of these status offenders as for children who have committed adult
crimes. In other words, in the name of "parental care," children who are not guilty
of any crime are processed through basically a "criminal" system.
5. Orlando & Black, Classification of the Juvenile Court, -25 Juv. Jus. 13 (May
1974) [hereinafter cited as ORLANDO & BLACK].
6. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY-A REPORT ON
THE JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY CENSUS OF 1971 (Washing-
ton, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS OF
19711.
7. See LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (LEAA), U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OF-
FENDERS, 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTrruTIONAL-
IZATION].
8. M. Levin, Under Lock and Key: Juveniles in Jails and Detention, NA-
TIONAL ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS 1 (1974).
of the girls were adjudicated status offenders. 9 This situation can
be partially explained by the common practice of filing a petition
for "incorrigibility" or "beyond control" for girls, when, in fact,
their conduct would fall into the "criminal" category if committed
by adults. This practice probably results from either a tendency
to protect girls or the inability to prove a criminal act. It may also
reflect the fact that we, as a society, permit freer conduct for boys
than for girls.10
Despite the fact that some girls might continue to be convicted
under a system that denies the court jurisdiction for noncriminal
acts, it is still significant that, nationwide, over one-fourth of all
those confined to institutions have committed no criminal act.
Several studies have put the figure as high as forty to fifty per-
cent.'1 The net result of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over sta-
tus offenders is that youths are being funneled into the juvenile
court system and are stigmatized by the process in the same man-
ner as are children who have committed crimes.12
The actual impact of the court's jurisdiction over status offend-
ers is alarming, and its potential impact is even more frightening.
Recent studies report that perhaps ninety percent of all young
people have, at one time or another, performed an act for which
they could have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the court
under current juvenile statutes. Many of these children have
committed only relatively trivial PINS-type offenses.' 3 This statis-
tic implies that almost everyone who reads this paper, including
its author, has acted in a manner which could have resulted in in-
carceration if we had been caught and that disposition served the
9. CENSUS OF 1971 supra note 6.
10. Why Treat? supra note 3, at 27.
11. See Comment, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE
L.J. 1383 (1974) [hereinafter cited YALE PINS STUDY]. See also Klapmick, Chil-
dren's Rights: The Legal Rights of Minors in Conflict with Law of Social Custom, 4
CRIME AND DELINQ. LIT. 449, 470 (1972); cf. Downey, Why Children Are in Jail, 17
CHILDREN 21 (1970).
12. ORLANDo & BLACK supra note 5.
13. See Comment, Persons in Need of Supervision: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Treatment? 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 624, 628 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Con-
stitutional Right to Treatment]. The PINS classification
was developed to cover forms of deviant juvenile behavior which are con-
sidered disturbed, although not criminal, by adult standards. The New
York State Legislature, in creating this new status recognized that the
non-criminal conduct requisite for a PINS adjudication, in contrast to the
criminal conduct required for a juvenile delinquency adjudication also ne-
cessitated facilities commensurate with the required treatment methods
for these two distinct classes of children. It was intended that this new
classification would provide the courts with more flexibility, that PINS
would be treated separetly from juvenile delinquents, and that any stigma
would be eliminated (footnotes omitted).
Id.
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fancy of some juvenile court judge. Probably, all that stood be-
tween us and those heavy iron doors were caring parents and
blind luck. There are a multitude of children each and every year
who are not that lucky.
In the name of parens patriae, our American system of justice
has yearly denied thousands of children due process rights de-
clared essential to preserve the liberty of adults and then con-
fined them to institutions where conditions are intolerable. The
only "crime" many of these children committed was the crime of
being unwanted, unloved, or unmotivated. In many ways, they
were the victims of the adverse conditions of our society. Yet,
since we cannot lock up society, we lock up its children instead.
Recognizing this, Justice Fortas stated in Kent v. United States:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the
child received the worst of both worlds; that he gets neither the protec-
tions accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.
The juvenile does in fact receive the worst of both worlds. Al-
though the system has failed in its goal of rehabilitation as to
both status and criminal offenders, the continuation of the pres-
ent system cannot be justified as to status offenders. In the case
of children who have performed criminal acts, their continued de-
tention can be justified, and persuasively, by the theories of pun-
ishment and deterrence. However, once society admits that the
high ideals of rehabilitation and treatment have become words
without substance, then there can be no justification for depriving
children of their constitutional right to liberty without due proc-
ess of law. This right entails full procedural safeguards and the
substantive right not to be incarcerated unless convicted of a
crime.' 4
The purpose of this article is to argue for a significant change in
the way juvenile status offenders are currently treated. In the
first section of the article, one legislative approach to this problem
will be examined, that being the philosophy of radical noninter-
vention. In discussing this alternative, the focus will be on the
structural failings of the juvenile justice system and will consider
modifications.
14. As it currently exists, the juvenile justice system results in the status of-
fender being subjected to the worst of two approaches to deviant behavior by be-
ing viewed as both "sick" and "bad." See Malmquist, Juvenile Detention: Right
and Adequacy of Treatment Issues, 7 L. AND Soc'y. REV. 159, 160 (1972) (hereinaf-
ter cited as MALMQUIST].
The second portion of this article will evaluate legal solutions
that can be utilized by lawyers and judges to improve the plight
of the status offender. The main discussion will concern the
"right to treatment" as applied in the juvenile context; but other
legal avenues to the system's improvement will also be consid-
ered. Finally, combined legislative and legal solutions previously
proposed necessitates the making of some policy judgements as
to which courses merit the greatest attention.
It should be noted that this article is exclusively concerned
with the juvenile status offender. Thus, many of the solutions
evaluated will not directly improve the situation of the juvenile
who has been convicted of a criminal act, although this may be
the indirect result.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: RADICAL NONINTERVENTION
A. Operation of the Juvenile Justice System As It Applies to
Status Offenders.
As noted in the Introduction, the number of status offenders
who are deprived of their liberty by being restricted in a juvenile
institution is numerically significant. These statistics do not in-
clude those who were exposed to the torments of state interven-
tion but escaped confinement. Many of these children are
extremely young and face spending a significant developmental
period of their lives behind closed doors. A shocking aspect of a
great many PINS statutes is the absence of a minimum age limit
restricting the number of those over whom jurisdiction may be
exercised. While a few states do designate a minimum age limit
for status offenders, most define "child" simply as a person under
the age of eighteen, seventeen, or sixteen.15
1. Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders By Referral.
There exist a plethora of avenues through which a child can be-
come an adjudicated status offender. The most common method
involves referral of a child to the juvenile court on a PINS charge.
Usually the referring party is either a parent, guardian, or custo-
dian, or a school, police, or welfare official. 16 The parent consti-
15. Rosenberg & Robenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rebelious Son]. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 13 § 350 (3) (1959) (under 16); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 571-2(5) (Supp.
1974) (less than 18); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1569(3) (West Supp. 1975) (less than
17). Id. at n.21.
16. Id. at 1103. For example, a recent New York survey discloses that parents
or parental surrogates initiated fifty-nine percent of all PINS actions, twenty-five
percent were instituted by other parties, such as unrelated individuals and police.
See ADMIN. BD. OF N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT FOR JUDICIAL YEAR 1972-73,
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tutes the most significant referring party, accounting for roughly
fifty-nine percent, for example, of referrals in New York.' 7
Subsequent to referral, a petition is filed with the appropriate
juvenile court. The court is generally required to decide whether
the child is to be released into the parent's custody or whether he
will be confined to some sort of institution to await adjudication.
Statutory bases for confinement vary from state to state, but gen-
erally include the necessity for protection of the public and the
child, the probability that the child will return for his hearing, the
availability of proper supervision at home or in some other place
of disposition and the likelihood that the child will commit a crim-
inal act before trial.18
Although most juvenile statutes prescribe the standards upon
which committment decisions are to be made, studies indicate
that in many jurisdictions, the determining factor is the willing-
ness of the parent(s) to take the child home.19 A major study in
New York disclosed that in about half of all interim detentions,
the committment decision was based upon parental refusal to re-
turn the youth to the family home.20 Although one court has held
that this type of decision constitutes denial of equal protection,2 1
it continues to be the prevailing practice. Thus, to a great extent,
a child is doubly-punished by being unwanted and by being sub-
jected to the potential horror of a juvenile institution or, perhaps,
an adult jail. Whether a child is brought to court and whether he
is incarcerated often depends less on his own conduct but on the
331 (1974). Another such study, involving 316 PINS children in New York City who
were removed from their homes by court action, found that sixty-five percent of
the PINS petitions in the survey were filed by the children's mothers. See OFFICE
OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, THE PINS
CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS 44 (1973). See also LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON
DEINSTrrUTIONALIZATION, supra note 7, at 7-8.
17. See ADMIN. BOARD OF NEW YORK JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, REPORT FOR JUDI-
cIAL YEAR 1972-73, at 331 (1974).
18. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1104. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171
(subd. 1) (1971); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT. § 739 (a) (McKinney 1975); UNIFORM JUVE-
NILE COURT ACT § 14.
19. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1105.
20. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 11, at 1396-97. "Moreover, when such a
punitive detention occurs, in two out of three cases the youth is placed in a prison-
like secure facility; a rate of secure detention as high as that for juveniles who the
court fears will commit a criminal act." Id.
21. See In re Norman C. 74 Misc. 2d. 710, 345 N.Y.S.2d. 338 (Fam. Ct. 1973)
(holding that secure detention for a child accused of delinquency for the sole
grounds that he had no parent to whom he could be paroled constituted a denial
of equal protection of the law.)
fortuitous consequences of parental tolerance and compassion, an
area over which he has little or no control.
Interestingly, older status offenders are more apt to be declared
guilty of the status offense than are younger children. Generally,
there are two major reasons for this result, neither of which is
very appealing on its face. First, as juvenile court judges are
often parents themselves, they may identify with parents facing
problems with their teenage child and thus be more inclined to
accede to the parents' wishes. This seems to be a suspect reason
to deprive a person of his liberty. Second, the petition for a PINS-
adjudication may be the welfare department's substitute for a
"neglect proceeding" in the case of older children, where it feels
that it cannot adequately make the case for parental "neglect" or
"dependency." Juvenile court personnel generally prefer PINS
proceedings which, in all probability, will be concluded quickly
with some "confession of guilt" by the child.22 The higher burden
on the state in neglect proceedings reflects a policy judgement by
the legislature that state intervention is not justified absent a cer-
tain threshold level of demonstrated improper parental care. Be-
low that point, there is a fundamental core of family privacy into
which the state should not intrude. When the status offense is so
used as to circumvent this zone, it is a clear abuse of the discre-
tion of the juvenile court.
Often, the complaining party has the option to utilize commu-
nity resources, such as voluntary services or the court's probation
department, before he turns to the juvenile court for relief. How-
ever, not all states require that the petitioner investigate alterna-
tives to a PINS adjudication prior to commencing his action.
Some states sanction direct refusal on the part of the parents to
avail themselves of the intake procedure. 23 In fact, a number of
jurisdictions permit a petitioner to file a PINS petition against a
child even if the probation department has investigated the case
and recommended informal disposition. 24 The impact of these
types of provisions is that parents or other complaining parties
generally have unfettered access to the juvenile court despite the
availability and superiority of other dispositional alternatives less
offensive to the child.
22. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 11, at 1393-97.
23. See, Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1103. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24 A-
1001(3) (Supp. 1975); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-810(e) (Supp. 1975); UNI-
FORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 10(a)(3).
24. Id. at 1103-4. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-8(3) (Smith-Hurd 1972);
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 734(b) (McKinney 1975). 1
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2. Improper Use of the Status Offense.
It is very difficult to specify what acts justify adjudication as
status offenses. Basically, any criminal act for which there is an
adult counterpart is usually a sufficient grounds for determining
that a child is a status offender. Additionally, most any noncrimi-
nal act which in any way offends the sensibilities of the presiding
juvenile judge is also sufficient. In many cases, what is punished
are instances of trivial misconduct. In many ways the juvenile
justice process has shifted from correcting criminal behavior in
children to enforcing parental dictates via the parens patriae
power of the state.
Related to the occasional triviality aspect of PINS offenses is
parental utilization of the juvenile court in order to divest them-
selves of the responsibility of caring for their children. Through
the creation of the juvenile justice system, society has indirectly
communicated to parents that should they find the burdens of
raising their children unpleasant, society will relieve them of that
burden through its juvenile justice system. The unloving, uncar-
ing, irresponsible parent is then rewarded by the status offense
system since he is given the option of shifting his responsibility to
the state. It is time that society change this aspect of the system
and place the ultimate responsibility for rearing children back on
the family where it belongs.
The vagueness of the standards for commitment as a "status of-
fender" has bred one further abuse. Status jurisdiction is often
utilized as a substitute for a charge of delinquency where the
criminal act cannot be proved.25 This practice constitutes a de
facto denial of the procedural and substantive rights guaranteed
a juvenile under In re Gault.26 By allowing a PINS finding to be
included in a more serious criminal charge as a "lesser included
offense," the juvenile justice system makes a mockery of the due
25. Id. at 1115-16. "In cases where there is insufficient proof of drug-related
crimes, receipt of stolen goods, vehicular homicide, reckless driving, assault, bur-
glary, criminal mischief, or sex offenses, trial courts have instead made PINS find-
ings." Id. at 1116 (footnotes omitted).
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1967).
Under our constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kan-
garoo court. The traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure, indeed,
contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to es-
tablish precisely what the juvenile.did and why he did it-was it a prank
of adolescence or a brutal act threatening serious consequences to himself
or society unless corrected?"
Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
process model. The impact is to circumvent the constitutional re-
quirement of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"27 because some
states allow a lesser standard of proof in PINS cases. The vague-
ness inherent in the definition of status offenses allows the intro-
duction of minimal evidence to sustain a conviction. The use of
status offense proceedings has eroded many of the constitutional
.rights guaranteed to children by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the most blatant example of the dishonest use of a "pa-
rental control" statutes occured in Berkeley, California. A study
performed in that city 28 indicated that the local police were utiliz-
ing the "beyond parental control" statute to arrest and remove
from the area out-of-town juveniles who had come to spend the
summer in the city. The imposition of the statute was justified on
the theory that since the parents were not accompanying their
children, the children were "beyond parental control" and thus
subject to arrest and disposition under the statute. These chil-
dren were arrested, booked and fingerprinted despite the fact that
most of them were there with the permission of their parents.
Later, when this practice was publicized, children coming to
Berkeley produced notorized letters from their parents indicating
that the parents knew of their whereabouts and approved of their
activities. Despite these letters, many of these children were ar-
rested, booked and sent home. It was clear that the Berkeley Po-
lice Department suspected that many of these children were
involved in minor street crime, although they had no proof of
such. The authorities also felt that those children who were not
involved in crime were a "nuisance" to the community, and that
their exodus would improve living conditions for the tax-paying
residents. Thus, the police and the courts utilized this ordinance
to remove these children from the city, despite the fact that they
had committed no provable wrong. This episode is a clear case of
extension of a vague statute to control behavior of which a law
enforcement agency disapproves, but which is not prohibited by
law.
27. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-68 (1970).
28. Comment, California Predelinquency Statute: A Case Study and Sug-
gested Alternatives, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1163 (1972). Berkeley was a haven for large
numbers of young people during the days of the free speech movement and stu-
dent activism.
The summer of 1970, like previous summers, witnessed an influx of young
people. In response to this situation, the Berkeley Police Department em-
ployed a "runaway net" and detained and returned over 1,000 children to
their parents. Anyone who appeared to be a nonresident of the city under
the age of 18 and was unaccompanied by a responsible adult was subject
to detention by the police.
Id. at 1169 (footnotes omitted).
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The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice surveyed practices such as these and noted:
In addition to behavior that would be criminal on the part of an adult, de-
linquency includes behavior illegal only for a child: conduct uniquely chil-
dren's--truancy, incorrigibility-and conduct tolerated for adults but
objectionable for children-smoking, drinking, using vulgar language, vio-
lating curfew laws, hanging around in bars or with felons or gamblers.
The provisions on which intervention in the category of cases is based are
typically vague and all-encompassing: Growing up in idleness and crime,
engaging in immoral conduct, in danger of leading an immoral life. Espe-
cially when administered with the informality characteristic of the court's
procedures, they establish the judge as arbiter not only of the behavior
but also of the morals of every child (and to an extent the parents of every
child) appearing before him.29
When you reach the bottom line, all that can be said definitely
about the juvenile court intake process is that little can be said
definitely about it. The system is characterized with endless dis-
cretion on the part of parents, the police and judges. 30 The result
is that intake decisions are often made on factors other than the
seriousness of the offense and the needs of the child.
The seriousness of the allegation often bears little relation to
whether a case is settled informally or taken to court. At the ini-
tial police contact point, the disposition often fails to reflect the
gravity of the offense. A study conducted by Piliavin and Briar
concerning police encounters with juveniles reported that the de-
meanor of the child was one of the most important factors influ-
encing police decisions. Approximately ninety percent of the
cases studied by these researchers were decided on the basis of
the child's demeanor rather than the nature and gravity of the of-
fense. Also, police decisions were influenced by the child's age,
race, and style of dress. 31
29. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 25 (Washing-
ton, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT].
30. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WALD].
31. It is not surprising to find abuse in such a system of uncontrolled policy
discretion. One of the hallmarks of the criminal justice system viewed as essential
to protect individual liberties is some check on police practices. In the case of
small children, such checks are virtually nonexistent. Instead of relying on the
Constitution to protect the rights of juveniles, we defer that responsibility to their
tailor and speech teacher. Piliavin & Briar, Policy Encounters With Juveniles,
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 206-14 (Sept. 1964).
Even at the formal adjudication stage, the seriousness of the of-
fense often has only peripheral importance. Sexual misbehavior 32
is treated with greater severity than many criminal acts. 3 3 A case
that reaches this point in the process is automatically adjudi-
cated.34 This makes the child the victim of chance and the persis-
tence of the court as much as of his own criminal activity.
Adjudication is more likely if the parents do not tire of court pro-
ceedings, the youth does not age beyond the court's jurisdiction,
and no one in the system convinces the parent and the child to
agree to an alternative disposition. 35
The single thread running through both the preadjudication and
formal adjudication stages is that the child's needs are frequently
lost in the shuffle. Detention is more probable in the case of mi-
nor allegations of ungovernable activity than in cases involving
serious runaways and persons accused of assault.36 The vast
majority of those confined are sent to secure institutions that
closely resemble adult penal institutions, irrespective of the of-
fense charged. An inspection of these dispositions indicate that
financial or other non-treatment related reasons govern the
court's placement decision rather than some notion of what would
be in the best interests of the child.
3. Discharge of the Child
The only thing in the juvenile justice system that appears to be
more discretionary and arbitrary than the intake decision is the
decision regulating the outflow from the juvenile institution.
32. Often this means any sexual activity at all, especially if the accused child
is female.
33. YALE PINS STuDY, supra note 11, at 1398-99. "Fifty percent of the cases in
which there are allegations of sexual misbehavior are adjudicated; in contrast,
only 36 percent of cases in which there are criminal ellegations are adjudicated."
Id. at 1399 n.102.
34. Id. at 1399. "In 60 percent of cases, the youth admits the allegations
against him in full; in 24 percent the youth admits the allegations against him in
part. Thus, in only 7 percent of cases is there a denial of the allegations." Id. at
199 n.103.
35. Id. at 1399. "When the court eventually decides upon an 'appropriate' dis-
position (footnote omitted), the degree to regulation and service it mandates for
the youth often seems an incongruously small return on the court's investment of
time (footnote omitted) and labor, especially in light of the imposition upon the
youth and his family." Id. at 199.
36. Id. at 1398.
For example, in cases involving such minor allegations as verbal abuse
and undesirable companions the detention rates are 57 percent and 55 per-
cent respectively. In cases involving more serious charges like assault,
malicious mischief, and robbery, the detention rates are 14 percent, 25 per-
cent, and zero percent, respectively.
Id. at 1398 n.98.
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Again, immense discretion is allowed and the decision is seldom
reviewed. The length of stay in juvenile facilities has little, if any,
rational relation to the seriousness of the offense or the effective-
ness of treatment. The result is that status offenders are often
confined for longer periods than serious offenders.37 Rena Uviller,
presently Director of the Juvenile Rights Division of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union has observed that PINS children placed
in state training schools remain incarcerated for much longer pe-
riods than delinquents who commit serious crimes because many
parents of PINS children oppose their return to the family
home.38 Another similar study reveals the same conclusion:
Length of stay is more likely to be determined by the adjustments to insti-
tutional rules and routines, the receptivity of parents or guardians to re-
ceiving children back home, available bed space in cottages and other
treatment facilities, and the current treatment ideology. Juvenile status
offenders tend to have more family trouble and may actually have greater
difficulty in meeting the criteria for release than their delinquent peers.
The result is that the delinquents without crimes probably spend more
time in institutions designed for delinquent youth than "real" deli-
quents.
3 9
B. Arguments for Radical Nonintervention
As has been demonstrated, the juvenile justice system is in
need of a major overhaul. The change advocated is the adoption
of a philosophy of "radical nonintervention" as applied to status
offenders. Radical nonintervention involves withdrawal of the ju-
venile court's jurisdiction over acts which would not constitute a
crime in the case of an adult. Additionally, all aspects of state in-
tervention should be prohibited unless specifically mandated by
some other statute such as the Health and Safety Code. There
are several reasons for advancing this position.
37. See Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition, CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY ISSUES (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health
Service: Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, Washington
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975) [hereinafter cited as STONE].
38. See Letter to the N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 22, col. 1.
39. See Note, Nondelinquent Children in New York, 1972 COL. J. LAW AND Soc.
PROBs. 249, 267.
Id.
1. Ineffectiveness of Intervention
First, state intervention in the case of status offenders is in
many cases ineffective. It must be noted that the stated goals of
state intervention in the case of status offenders are rehabilitation
and treatment. It is by this standard that the juvenile justice sys-
tem must be judged as it applies to status offenders.
The goal of juvenile rehabilitation has been unrealized. The hu-
manitarian concern for the welfare and rehabilitation of PINS has
rarely been implemented by the juvenile courts. 40
Despite the ... rhetoric which has accompanied the juvenile court move-
ment, it has been amply demonstrated that the country's juvenile courts
have simply lacked the resources to live up to their pretentions. In the
main, the dispositional alternatives available in the case of minors alleged
to be beyond the control of his parents or custodian are precisely the
same as those available in the case of a minor charged with the violation
of a penal law .... 41
The effect of the broad jurisdiction of the juvenile court is to
subject millions of young, frightened children to what is, in real-
ity, a criminal justice system. In this system they are called
criminals so often that, eventually, they begin to believe it. The
system causes them to identify with a criminal peer group and de-
prives them of their precious freedom as punishment for acts of
youthful disobedience. As a means of deterring criminal actions,
coercive treatment as exercised by the juvenile justice system has
been a massive failure.
It should be noted that the existence of status offense jurisdic-
tion is a major factor contributing to the breakdown of the juve-
nile justice system. The mistaken legislative ideas revealed in
juvenile law statutes, that the state can better raise children than
can the children's parents, has led society to escape careful evalu-
ation of the system and to overburden the system to such an ex-
tent that it is unlikely to be effective.4 2
The net effect of this system collapse is that few children are re-
ceiving any form of real treatment. Many major investigations of
state training schools and significant appellate division case law
demonstrate that these schools totally fail to provide status of-
fenders with appropriate rehabilitative treatment.43 Several ma-
jor investigative studies of shelters and training schools have
40. See Note, Treatmentfor Misbehaving Minors, 20 CATH. LAw 106-07 (Spring
1974) [hereinafter cited as Misbehaving Minors].
41. See Gough, Beyond Control Child, 16 ST. Louis L.J. 182, 190 (1971) [herein-
after cited as Beyond Control].
42. See ORLANDO & BLACK, supra note 3, at 19.
43. Beyond Contro supra note 41, at 107-08. See note 45 infra; see, e.g., In re
Jeanette P. 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S. 2d 125 (2d Dep't 1970); In re Lloyd, 33
App. Div. 2d 419, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 419 (1st Dep't 1970).
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been conducted in New York. Doctor Stone of Harvard outlines
the results of one of those inquiries:
As for conditions at the shelters, New York State Attorney General
Lefowitz has termed them "disgraceful," "dreadful," and "inade-
quate"...... Overcrowding has converted virtually all potentially thera-
peutic space--classrooms, craft rooms, lounges, etc.-into dormitories
.... Psychiatric care and drug abuse help is said to be virtually nonexis-
tent. . . . Staffing is chronically thin; one shelter with an average popula-
tion of 121 girls was budgeted in 1970 for 21 psychiatric manhours per
week, including diagnosis and consultations .... Despite an occasional
rash of election time promises for reform and new appropriations ... con-
ditions in the shelter show no hope of improvement in the forseeable fu-
ture.44
There are some who argue that one need not be concerned with
the conditions in the shelter facilities since they provide mainly
transitional care and that treatment within the state's training
schools and institutions is a far higher level. Unfortunately, facts
do not support such a conclusion. In December of 1973, Arthur
Levitt, State Comptroller of New York, disseminated a report on
the conditions and treatment programs in state training schools. 45
The general conclusion of this report was to the effect that insuffi-
cient funding and inadequate staffing mandated treatment levels
below acceptable standards.
Rehabilitative treatment can have little chance of success un-
less there is a sufficient number of qualified personnel providing
that treatment. 46 The Levitt study found both insufficient pre-em-
ployment preparation and a lack of in-staff training provided by
the schools. 47 The study indicated that there was an absence of a
standard civil service requirement for a beginning child care
worker and that senior, principal, and head child-care workers
need only have a minimum of two years experience in institu-
tional care for delinquents in addition to a high school diploma.4 8
Given the poor working conditions in most state institutions and
the paucity of employment qualifications, it is no wonder that
even a full ward of staff-workers cannot effectively cope with the
problems of the delinquent child.
44. STONE, supra note 37, at 153 (footnotes omitted).
45. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF AUDITS AND ACCOUNTS, REP.
No. A1-15-74, AUDIT REPORT ON REHABILITATION OF ADOLESCENTS AT STATE RESI-
DENTIAL FACILITIES, EXECUTIVE DEPT., DIVISION OF YOUTH (1973) [hereinafter cited
as AUDIT REPORT].
46. Id. at 44.
47. Id. at 44-47.
48. Id. at 44.
The professional members of the staff include the psychiatrists,
psychologist and social workers, who theoretically are responsible
for providing the child's treatment and his physical and emotional
needs. In 1972 the Committee on Mental Health Services, headed
by Justice Polier, reported on the quality of professional services
in New York's training schools:
The fragmented, fractional, and inadequate psychiatric, psychological, and
casework services made available by the state for training schools cannot
possibly provide even a modicum of the treatment services that the chil-
dren require. It is doubtful that the part-time psychiatrists . . . can ade-
quately screen all new admissions and advise on medication, special
programs, transfers and discharges.
4 9
State training schools are, at least in theory, educational institu-
tions. However, the Levitt report also concluded that the educa-
tional services provided in these facilities are far below minimum
standards. The report found "inconsistent patterns" of educa-
tional services, with classroom time varying from three and one-
half to ten hours per week per pupil. Some schools were without
remedial reading programs and high absentee rates were discov-
ered among both students and teachers. 50
In many of these schools, drug tranquilization is substituted for
effective treatment programs. The drug tranquilization practice is
used for custodial and control reasons without any treatment jus-
tification.5 ' This practice is indicative of the philosophy of many
training schools in New York. With regard to the educational and
mental health care at these schools, the findings of the Levitt and
Polier reports demonstrate the irrevelence of these institutions to
the actual needs of ungovernable children. As Judge Beatrice S.
Bursten of the Family Court of Nassau County concluded: "There
is not a single training institution that can really boast of being a
residental treatment center."52 In light of the results of these and
numerous studies, it is not surprising that many have called for
the virtual shut-down of nearly all of these institutions.5 3
Clearly, this is not a situation unique to New York.54 These
menancing institutions have been spawned throughout the land.
In Illinois, a study recently disclosed that eighty percent of the
children committed to state juvenile facilities are placed in custo-
49. See COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE
FAmLY COURT IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK. JUSTICE CONFOUNDED: Pretensions and
Realities of Treatment Services 52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CONFOUNDED].
50. AUDIT REPORT, supra note 45, at 3-5, 11-35.
51. STONE, supra note 37, at 154.
52. AUDIT REPORT, supra note 45, at 5.
53. Citizens Committee for Children of New York, The New York Training
School System 5 (1967).
54. Janowitz, forward to STREET, WINTER, & PERROW, ORGANIZATION FOR
TREATMENT at xi (he estimates that a least one-half of all juvenile institutions are
basically custodial).
[Vol. 6: 639, 19791 Radical Nonintervention
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dial institutions similar to adult penal institutions rather than in
rehabilitative centers designed to provide child care.55
The crisis generated by the inexcusable conditions in juvenile
facilities is compounded by the general paucity of resources allo-
cated to the juvenile justice system. The impact of inadequate
funding is lack of alternative dispositions. The juvenile courts
have never been given the personnel, facilities, auxiliary services,
and operating funds essential to meeting the idealistic goal of
rehabilitation.5 6 The President's Commission of Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice reported that the juvenile
courts have consistently failed to attract qualified judges. The tre-
mendous case overloads force the system to spend far too little
time considering the merits of each individual case. Additionally,
there is a severe shortage of professionals who are able to deal
with children outside of juvenile institutions. Even when these
specialists are available to evaluate the child and his emotional
problems, the lack of appropriate services and facilities often
reduces their work to mere "paper recommendations" to be filed
and forgotten. The net impact is that individual treatment has be-
come a goal in search of a reality.
Numerous advocates of the rehabilitative model assert that pro-
bation can be an effective alternative to institutionalization. Even
if the premise of effectiveness is accepted, the scarcity of re-
sources has blocked any contribution that large-scale probation
programs could have made. A recent study of juvenile courts has
revealed that on a nationwide basis, one-third of juvenile courts
have no probation officers or social workers.57
Even when probation services are provided, they are usually
cumbersome and inefficiently organized. The President's Com-
55. See Renn, The Right to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY 477, 477 (1975).
56. MIDONICK, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE COURTS: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
UNGOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT 163 (1972).
57. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 8.
The dispositioned alternatives available even to the better endowed juve-
nile courts fall short of the richness and the relevance to individual needs
envisioned by the court's founders. In most places, indeed, the only alter-
natives are release outright, probation, and institutionalization. Probation
means minimal supervision at best. A large percentage of juvenile courts
have no probation services at all, and in those that do, caseloads are typi-
cally so high that counseling and supervision take the form of occasional
phone calls and perfunctory visits instead of the careful, individualized
service that was intended.
Id.
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
viewed the impact of inadequate resources on the probation sys-
tem and concluded: "Probation means minimal supervision at
best. Counselling and supervision take the form of occassional
phone calls and perfunctory visits instead of the careful, individu-
alized service that was intended."5 8
It is curious that a society known to so greatly value its children
that it created a special system to treat and help them has not
found it within its heart to provide the resources necessary to ef-
fectively operate this system. This is especially appalling when
one considers status offenders since the only justification for their
entry into the system was the notion that the state could help
them.
There are a multitude of evidentary facts that indicate the fail-
ure of the juvenile system. Courts and critics alike cite the high
rates of recidivism and crime among juveniles as evidence of its
lack of effectiveness. In 1973 twenty-three percent of all persons
arrested for violent crime and fifty-one percent of those arrested
for property related offenses were under the age of eighteen. 59
The recidivism rate among juveniles is even more shocking. A
study conducted for the President's Commission revealed that
sixty-one percent of juveniles referred to the court in the District
of Columbia in 1965 had been referred to the court at least once
before, and forty-two percent had been referred at least twice
before. 60 In a study conducted in Philadelphia it was found that
eight-four percent of offenses were committed by recidivists who
comprised fifty-four percent of the sample. Offenders with five or
more arrests comprising eighteen percent of the sample was re-
sponsible for fifty-one percent of delinquent acts.6 1
Even steadfast advocates of continued state intervention in the
lives of status offenders can cite little persuasive evidence as to
the effectiveness of the rehabilitative model. At best, these opti-
mists can argue that further research is imperative and that not
all the results are in. However, the juvenile justice system, as we
presently know it, arose over seventy-seven years ago, and every
year the juvenile justice process steals, and perhaps ruins, the
lives of hundreds of thousands of children.
58. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, (Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE].
59. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 1974 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 187
(1974).
60. REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA 773 (1966).
61. See Simpson, Rehabilitation of Juveniles, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 984, 987 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SIMPSON].
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The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Ad-
ministration of Justice, one of the most prestigious panels ever as-
sembled, surveyed the seventy-seven year history of the juvenile
court and concluded that: "(the juvenile justice system) has not
succeeded significantly in rehabilitating deliquent youth, in re-
ducing or even stemming the tide of juvenile criminality, or in
bringing justice and compassion to the child offender." 62 Not all
advocates of continued juvenile court jurisdiction over nondelin-
quent children are blind to the facts described above. However,
they maintain that the philosophy behind the system is sound
and that effectiveness can be guaranteed with some increased
funding and fine-tuning. The standard bureaucratic response that
increased funding is the panacea to all woes is easily applied to
the juvenile court.
While additional expenditures may improve institutional condi-
tions for actual delinquents, increased funding levels for status
offenders would be fruitless. Additional spending will not solve
the problems that surround status offenders because the underly-
ing philosophies behind the juvenile justice system renders it in-
herently ineffective in this area.
To a great extent, the juvenile justice system's treatment of sta-
tus offenders is predicated upon the "medical model" of delin-
quency. Vaguely, juvenile delinquency is deemed an illness with
medical cures. However, the medical model is inherently inappli-
cable to the juvenile status offender. It fails because of several
factors.
First, the medical model is inappropriate for diagnosis and
treatment. For many years social scientists, psychiatrists, proba-
tion officers, and juvenile court judges have accepted the medical
model in the area of juvenile delinquency prevention and treat-
ment at a high cost and with little success. This model has not
only proved to be misleading when applied to the causes and
cures of juvenile misbehavior but has, in fact, hindered poten-
tially successful corrective efforts.63 In April, 1975, Robert W.
Balch, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Mon-
tana, wrote a comprehensive article rejecting the imposition of
the medical model in the area of juvenile delinquency. He noted:
The disease analogy has a basic weakness: it obscures the nature of devi-
62. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 7.
63. See Balch, The Medical Model of Delinquency, 21 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
116 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BALCH].
ance. Unlike physical illness, juvenile delinquency has no existence apart
from the social judgements we make about behavior. If a person is physi-
cally ill-if he has a fever, for example-we can trace his symptoms to ob-
jective physiological conditions, an infection perhaps. But apart from
societal standards and moral judgements, there is no independent crite-
rion for the "sickness" we call delinquency.
6 4
The social deviance theory is even more applicable to status of-
fenders, for often their conduct consists merely of offending the
values of some older individuals. In short, there is no "qualita-
tive" difference between the status offender and the "normal"
child that appears when one compares a mentally ill patient to a
"normal" child. Delinquency is not a "disease." The principles
that guide our decisions about the causes and cures of physical,
and even mental ailments have little bearing on social deviants.
The effects of psychotherapy on these individuals varies to ex-
tremes ranging from significant improvement to horrendous dete-
rioration. Some studies which have recently appeared suggest
that other forms of treatment are equally hopeless. The lack of
treatment is no guarantee of further harm and the presence of
treatment does not promise the patient's improvement.
65 Al-
though some delinquent children may in fact be mentally ill, the
illness exists apart from their delinquency and is not an inherent
part of such behavior.
Second, the fact that delinquency tends to decline with age also
suggest the inappropriateness of the medical model. Most delin-
quents never become adult offenders whether or not they receive
treatment and regardless of the quality of treatment. Delin-
quency appears to be a passing stage that most children outgrow.
The reform through maturation is difficult to explain if we accept
the premises of the medical model.66
64. Id. at 117.
Consider the case of veneral disease. VD is more than a physical ill-
ness-there is a powerful social stigma attached to it. But remove the so-
cial stigma, even make VD a prestigious thing to have, and the physical
disorder remains. Venereal diseases exist independently of the judge-
ments we make about them. Juvenile delinquency is fundamentally dif-
ferent-the social judgment is everything. Remove the condemnation of
all those things we call juvenile misbehavior and delinquency would cease
to exist.
Id.
65. Id. at 124.
What holds for physical illness does not necessarily hold for social devi-
ance. There is some evidence that patients undergoing psychotherapy are
no more likely to improve than comparable persons who experience no
treatment whatsoever. Furthermore, the condition of those not under-go-
ing psychiatric treatment does not necessarily deteriorate; it may even im-
prove. The effects of psychotherapy are extremely variable, ranging from
marked improvement to severe deterioration.
Id. (footnote omitted).
66. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRixr (New York, John Wiley, 1964), chapters 4
and 5 (hereinafter cited as MATZA].
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Criticism of the medical model's place in juvenile delinquency
has not been confined to lawyers and social scientists. Several
members of the medical community have called for the abolition
of the medical model in this area. Dr. Alan Stone succinctly lists
the most important objections to viewing the juvenile crime prob-
lem as a medical matter:
In my view ... the solution to this dilemma cannot be found within the
medical model of the mental health profession because: (a) Inpatient psy-
chiatric facilities for children with rare exceptions have been horrendous.
(b) Whatever the value of traditional diagnostic criteria may be, they are
not readily applicable to child illness. (c) Psychoterapeutic methods that
do exist are geared to the intact family, and this is rarely the target group
of the juvenile courts. (d) Finally, as Justine Wise Polier points out, the
dollar and resource cost of the medical model approach is totally unrealis-
tic. 6 7 (Footnotes omitted.)
The medical model was the direct stimulus for the development
of juvenile institutions from which horror stories of inhuman con-
ditions have recently emerged. These institutions have been a
dismal failure for studies indicate that these juvenile institutions
have no measurable beneficial effect on children committed to
them.68 Despite this fact, many continue to be confined to these
dungeons each and every year in the name of "treatment."
The medical model of juvenile delinquency has been a signifi-
cant impetus to the intervention in the lives of status offenders. 69
Under the guise of helping the child, the concept of predelin-
quency has been seriously abused. In an important study,
Lerman learned that children adjudicated status offenders often
receive more severe dispositions than do hardened criminals.7 0
These children are usually confined with more serious offenders
who often pass on their criminal skills. This is all done in the
name of the medical model. The critical moral question is posed
by Professor Balch and remains one for all to answer: "is it fair to
67. STONE, supra note 37, at 145.
68. GmBONS, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR, 1970, chapter 10 [hereinafter cited as Gm-
BONS].
69. BALCH, supra note 63, at 127.
For example, Dr. Arnold Hutschnecker, a New York physician, has pro-
posed a nation-wide delinquency prevention program. According to his
plan, every six- or seven-year-old child in the country would be given a
battery of psychological tests to determine whether he has delinquent in-
clinations. Hutschnecker's pre-delinquents would be assigned to various
treatment programs, including interment camps for children with such an
unfavorable prognosis that they would probably never be able to adjust to
conventional social institutions without intensive care.
Id.
70. Lerman, Child Convicts, TRANSACTION 37 (July-August 1971).
subject a person to any form of treatment before he has commit-
ted a criminal offense? The dubious morality of treatment with-
out guilt is made all the more questionable by the absence of any
reliable method of identifying predelinquent children." 71
If a child who happens to be a status offender is truly mentally
ill, then the medical model might have some application and com-
mittment, in the name of treatment, if that treatment is provided,
might be justified. However, as to the general status offender, the
medical model gives him the worst of two worlds. To most of soci-
ety, although he may be confined in the name of medicine, he is
just another "punk" to them. Not only must he contend with this,
but he is also constantly reminded that he has been labeled
"sick." Now he is not only legally deviant, but he is psychologi-
cally ill as well.
The labeling process which so fascinates the medical commu-
nity may have a harmful effect on the juvenile. Proponents of this
model cite studies indicating that delinquent juveniles are imma-
ture, suspicious, hostile, distrustful, and irresponsible when com-
pared to nondelinquent children.7 2 The flaw in these studies is
that they were conducted solely upon institutional children. It is
no surprise that children forced to live in the dehumanizing con-
ditions of the typical juvenile institution would show these per-
sonality traits. According to one study, suspicion, hostility and
cynicism are natural products of the juvenile system itself.73
Treatment itself, where none is actually needed, may be harm-
ful. The stigma associated with the treatment may do more harm
to the child than any improvement he may experience as a result
of the treatment.74 Although most of the children subjected to the
juvenile system are not "sick," they are vulnerable and impres-
sionable. There is a significant chance that the stigma of "delin-
quency" will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.75
The final reason that the medical model should be rejected in
the juvenile framework is that it provides a convenient excuse for
horrendous institutions and ineffective treatment. If delinquency,
truancy, and underachievement can be explained on the basis of
the individual emotion and intellectual patterns of the child, then
the schools and juvenile institutions are relieved from blame for
the misbehavior of their children. The medical model focuses at-
tention away from the institution and on the individual. Also, the
71. BALCH, supra note 63, at 127.
72. GIBBONS, sUpra note 68, at 76-89.
73. MATZA, sUpra note 66.
74. Toby, An Evaluation of Early Identification Treatment Programsfor Prede-
linquents, SOCL PROBLEMS 175 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TOBY].
75. BALCH, supra note 63, at 124.
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protected position provided by the medical model, in that the
medical community possesses privileges as to communications
with its juvenile patients, is used to shield treatment decisions
from public scrutiny, even when the decision is to deny any treat-
ment whatsoever. Thus, the medical community is called upon to
enforce the discretion of the police and the courts without its
"medical" reasons ever being disclosed, other than by labeling the
juvenile's behavior as "deviant" or "incorigible." These medically
imposed labels insulate the court from the real world justifica-
tions for the removal of individual liberties, and excuses the
court's dispositions based upon these incomprehensible labels.
The claim of the medical community to privacy is used to shield
treatment decisions from public scrutiny, despite the fact that the
decision is to deny any treatment whatsoever. It enforces the dis-
cretion of the police and the courts to a frightening level. It insu-
lates the court from the real world where individual liberty is a
treasured commodity not to be taken lightly.
One basic premise of the medical model is that children are
more susceptible to treatment than adults. The facts have simply
not justified that conclusion.7 6 However, even if we accept that
thesis, we lack sufficient knowledge to transform that notion into
effective treatment.77 Our current knowledge of rehabilitating de-
linquents is so meager that we are utilizing techniques on a trial
and error basis. This implies that our nation's children have be-
come laboratory rats in a very costly experiment.7 8
In concluding this discussion on the underlying premises of the
juvenile justice system, I advance the polemic that we simply can-
76. SIMPSON, supra note 61, at 1012. "Maturational reform is not evidence of a
greater amenability to rehabilitative programs; the reform associated with age ap-
pears to occur whether or not the offender is apprehended," Id. (footnote omit-
ted).
77. MALMQUIST, supra note 14, at 189. See also ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 13 (1964).
Although various theories regarding etiology and treatment exist for
mental illness, there is more consensus on what should be done as treat-
ment even if it may not be available. With delinquents, no treatment ap-
proaches show any consistent degree of effectiveness-beyond the process
of aging. Although some challenge the position that treatment is the quid
pro quo for detaining a juvenile, this appears increasingly difficult to de-
fend. This is in view of recent court cases spelling out details, such as the
number of staff and need for an individualized treatment plan for each pa-
tient, in the civil commitment area (Wyatt v. Stickney, 1971).
Id.
78. MALMQUIST, supra note 14, at 160.
not improve the conditions of a child, especially a status offender,
with state intervention. There is a substantial body of psychologi-
cal and psychoanalytical evidence that, in general, children de-
velop best through close contact with a mother and father and
that substitutes for that framework act as a barrier to normal de-
velopment.79 Also, substantial evidence exists indicating that, ex-
cept in the case of seriously harmed children such as those
physically abused, we cannot improve a child's situation with co-
ercive state intervention. Usually a child is harmed more by the
intervention than he is helped. This is true whether the interven-
tion takes the form of actual removal of the youth from his home
or probation.80 The parents will often resent the outside med-
dling of the court and blame the child for this situation. Thus, im-
provement is also hopeless if the family resists the in-home
therapy.8 ' The only remaining step is removal but no evidence in-
dicates that children are always helped through compulsory
placement.82
Professor Wald of Stanford best sums up this position: "In an
ideal world, children would not be brought up in "inadequate"
homes. However, our less than ideal society lacks the ability to
provide better alternatives for these children. The best we can do
is expand our social services for families on a voluntary basis." 83
Given the fact that the philosophies underlying the juvenile jus-
tice system are inappropriate, it is no surprise that its major
weapons render it inherently ineffective.
Institutionalization is the major, and most offensive, tool of the
juvenile court. Major studies have proven that a uniformly posi-
tive rehabilitative effect can be discounted since there is little evi-
dence of a reduction in recidivism resulting from the
incarceration.8 4 The California Assembly Interim Committee of
79. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 32-
34 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND]. This thesis contends that disruptions of
continuity have different consequences for different ages: infancy, young children,
school-age children, adolescents, and adults. Id.
80. WALD, supra note 30, at 993.
81. Id. at 1023. "Few communities have sufficient personnel and programs to
permit meaningful intervention, even in cases involving physical abuse or severe
emotional damage. It is highly questionable whether limited resources ought to
be expended on families with less severe problems, unless the families request
services or accept them voluntarily." Id.
82. Id. at 1023.
83. Id. at 1024.
84. Clarke, Getting 'Em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration of Juvenile Of-
fenders Reduce Crime?, 65 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw AND CRIMINOLOGY 528, 528
(1974) [hereinafter cited as CLARKE]. This study was concerned only with the re-
habilitative effect of commitment. The removal effect and the natural decline in
recidivism due to maturation were thus factored out in this portion of the study
but later considered.
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Procedure concluded that there was "not a single shred of evi-
dence ... to indicate that any significant number (of beyond con-
trol children) have benefited from juvenile institutionalization."8 5
It reviewed the operation of the entire juvenile system (although
its main focus in the treatment stage was on institutionalization)
and concluded:
There is no significant evidence that the court's beyond control jurisdic-
tion has been effective in turning runaways, truants, promiscuous girls,
and other incorrigibles into the kind of children whose behavior patterns
satisfy adult expectations. There is even less evidence that Section 60186
has produced happier, healthier children who go on to become better
adults because of their court, probation, or institutional experience.8 7
The resounding conclusion is that compulsory institutionaliza-
tion is inherently ineffective.8 8 The major reasons are three-fold.
First, the element of compulsion often renders the subject so hos-
tile that any treatment is impossible. Second, institutionalization
of the status offender is likely to be self-defeating because it
shifts the focus away from the family where the problem is based
and must be resolved. Even an adequately funded and staffed in-
stitution presents a subculture that is antithetical to family inte-
gration and subverts the regenerative process.89 Third, the nature
of institutional living itself produces a delinquent subculture
which quickly assimilates status offender. This subculture mili-
tates against traditional treatment approaches and, in effect, be-
comes the antithesis of treatment.90
These facts usually produce outcries from interventionalists for
85. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMMrPTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE, JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESSES 7 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CAL. ASSEMBLY].
86. California's beyond control statute, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West
1971).
Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually re-
fuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his par-
ents, guardian, custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond the
control of such person, or any person who is a habitual truant from school
within the meaning of any law of this state, or who from any cause is in
danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, is within the ju-
risdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a
ward of the court.
Id.; see also, § 602.1, "Referral of habitually disobedient or truant minors to school
attendance," and § 601.2, "Failure of parent, guardian, or person in charge of minor
to respond to directives of school attendance review board; disposition of minor."
Id.
87. CAL. ASSEMBLY, supra note 85, at 30-31.
88. MALMQUIST, supra note 14, at 173.
89. BEYOND CONTROL, supra note 41, at 191.
90. SCOTT & HISSONG, CHANGING THE DELINQUENT SUBCULTURE: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL APPROACH 509 (1970).
increased funding. However, given the inherent defects in institu-
tionalization, higher spending levels cannot be expected to im-
prove results significantly. Greater funding could allow
improvement of conditions in these institutions, but the improve-
ment in conditions cannot be correlated to increased rehabilita-
tion.91 Even with unlimited financial resources, there is a great
possibility that we would not be able to obtain the manpower nec-
essary to implement a treatment mandate. 92 In fact, psychistric
and psychological experts now suggest that even with an ideal
placement (which includes institutionalization), separation from
the family is itself sufficiently traumatic to be justified only under
the most extreme conditions. 93 The basic problem was best ex-
plained in a report issued by the President's Commission after its
review of situations where funding levels were increased:
The failure of the juvenile court to fulfill its rehabilitative and preventive
promise stem in important measure from a grossly overoptimistic view of
what is known about the phenomenon of juvenile criminality and of what
even a fully equipped juvenile court could do about it .... Study and re-
search tend increasingly to support the view that delinquency is not so
much an act of individual deviancy as a pattern of behavior produced by a
multitude of pervasive societal influences well beyond the reach of the ac-
tions of any judge, probation officer, correctional counselor, or psychia-
trist.9 4
The ultimate conclusion of the Task Force was that "[ilt seems
the better part of both wisdom and justice to use institutional
confinement only for those who would be dangerous to the com-
munity without it."
Another major tool utilized in the juvenile justice system is pro-
bation. Probation is often a failure for all parties involved. Proba-
tion departments are notoriously understaffed, underfunded, and
overworked.9 5 However, increased staffing and funding to reduce
the caseload does not appear to be the answer. Studies suggest
that mere reduction in the size of caseloads does not, in itself,
lower the recidivism rate of the supervised group.96
91. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 11, at 1402.
92. See Note, Treatment for Juveniles, 1973 WASH. L.Q. 157 [hereinafter cited
as Juveniles].
93. Thomas, Child Neglect Proceeding-A New Focus, 50 IND. L.J. 60, 72 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as THOMAS]. See, e.g., In re Barron, 268 Minn. 48, 53-54, 127
N.W.2d 702, 706 (1964).
94. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 8 (emphasis added).
95. Kittrie, The Juvenile Process, 57 GEORGIA UJ. 848 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Kittrie]. A 1966 survey showed that about 75% of the juvenile courts reported
no inservice training for their probation officers and a maximum annual salary of
less than $5,000. Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in
a Correctional System?, 31 FED. PROBATION 26, 30 n.15 (Mar. 1967). See also Ketch-
am, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97,
104 (1961).
96. See Constitutional Right to Treatmen4 supra note 13, at 639.
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A "shining star" in an oaises of dispair is the status often
claimed by private "voluntary" agencies. They are usually volun-
tary only in relation to the parent, since the child usually has no
choice as to his disposition. Several authorities argue that the
public-private distinction is meaningless to the child because the
element of compulsion is present in both treatment programs. 97
However, even if we assume that the quality of care and treat-
ment is better in voluntary agencies, the inquiry cannot stop
there. The admissions policies of these voluntary institutions are
often discriminatory and cause the juvenile great emotional
stress. The usual practice is to make only one referral at a time
so that the child is forced to stay in a temporary shelter or a pub-
lic institution while the agency makes its decision. Some proba-
tion officers are convinced that a child's emotional problems are
compunded when he is rejected by the agency on a "preplace-
ment visit." In the final analysis, few status offenders are ac-
cepted by the voluntary agencies. Doctor Stone, describing the
practices of voluntary agencies, states:
Ironically, little is known about the quality of care provided by any of the
voluntary agencies . . . . However, since the agencies are funded at a
higher level than other programs such as training centers and usually pro-
vide care to smaller numbers in smaller units, it is assumed that they pro-
vide somewhat better care. Unfortunately, however, just 26 percent of the
children placed with the agencies (in New York) go to residental centers
(5 percent) or special treatment-oriented units (21 percent) which provide
the best therapy. The remainder receive less good care. In sum, the agen-
cies ... for the most part ceased to serve those children with the fewest
resources in their homes, schools, and communities and those with the
more severe problems 9 8 (Footnotes omitted).
In New York, only five institutions operated by two voluntary
agencies accepted a significant number of juveniles in 1973. This
is a deplorable situation given the massive influx of public funds
into these private agencies. During 1970, the "residential treat-
ment centers," which have a capacity of serving 929 children, ac-
cepted only seven delinquent boys and sixty-three male and
female status offenders. This was a mere "drop in the bucket"
when compared to total commitment that year.99
The final major dispositional alternative available to the juve-
nile court is commitment to a foster home. The foster care model
97. Ferdinand, Some Inherent Limitations in Rehabilitating Juvenile Delin-
quents in Training Schools, 31 FED. PROBATION 30, 36 (Dec. 1967).
98. STONE, supra note 37, at 152 (footnotes omitted).
99. Const. Right to Treatment, supra note 13, at 643.
is subject to a number of intrinsic defeats. Initially, it is ex-
tremely difficult to find a sufficient number of qualified foster par-
ents who are willing to care for the kind of children who would be
placed there through the juvenile justice process.OO Conse-
quently, many youths earmarked for foster homes end up spend-
ing more time in institutions awaiting placement than they do in
the foster homes.101 Even after a child is placed, he will probably
not stay with the same foster parents for a long period of time
and will be subject to a number of moves. Each placement can
have a devastating impact on the child's emotional develop-
ment.102
Even for children fortunate enough to have continuity of care,
the act of placement in a strange environment in the emotionally
formative years can create significant psychological problems.
Children often see foster care placement as punishment for
blameworthy conduct on their part. They also suffer identity
problems and extreme conflicts of loyalty, since they are exposed
to at least three sets of authoritarian adults, the natural parents,
the foster parents, and the social worker. Two experts examined
these problems and concluded: "It is our conviction that no child
can grow emotionally while in limbo .... He cannot invest ex-
cept in a minimal way ... if tomorrow the relationship may be
severed."103
Courts, like those in Pennsylvania, are beginning to realize that
although a natural home may be less than ideal for a child, inter-
vention by foster care agencies may well be worse. 104 Their wis-
dom appears to be justified since one study shows that between
forty and fifty percent of children in foster homes in every com-
munity studies showed symptoms of maladjustment.10 5
After reviewing the evidence concerning the rehabilitative effec-
tiveness of the major tools of the juvenile justice system, the con-
clusion is inevitable that none of their promises have come true
for the status offender. Of course, some children may appear to
improve after state intervention. However, the overwhelming pre-
ponderance of evidence suggests that improved child would have
done so without intervention through maturation and for every
child we genuinely help, we commit hundreds to a life of crime
and emotional instability.
100. FANSHEL, FOSTER PARENTHOOD 163-67 (1966).
101. COLE, OUR CHILDREN'S KEEPERS 63-99 (1972).
102. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE AuDrr COMMrEEE, REPORT ON THE STATE'S ROLE
IN FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA (No. 148.2) 748 (1974).
103. Bryce & Ehlert, 144 Foster Children, 50 CHILD WELFARE 499, 503 (1971).
104. See Note, 35 Prrr. L. REv. 732, 822 (Fall 1973).
105. See 38 CHID WELFARE 5, 16 (1969).
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2. Counterproductive
Perhaps we could tolerate a system that only squandered
money because of its inherent ineffectiveness. But we cannot af-
ford to tolerate a system that squanders the lives of our children
because of some unrealistic ideals. The juvenile justice system
results in a tremendous waste of human potential. Thus, a second
major contention is that the juvenile justice system is counter-
productive. We intervene in the name of helping the child. How-
ever, the net result is that the child is often far worse off after the
intervention. This is largely because institutionalization, the ma-
jor tool of state intervention, is counterproductive.
As previously indicated, we institutionalize status offenders to
save them from a life of crime and immoral conduct. The result of
institutionalization is often to lead the child down that path. 0 6
There are three primary reasons that explain the inherent
counter-productivity of institutionalization. First, the status of-
fender, who is not a criminal, assumes the mores and customs of
the institutional society. The impact is the internalization of the
criminal self-concept. One major study dealing with this subject
concluded that commitment commences a negative labeling proc-
ess and the result is that the children committed develop depreci-
ated self-images.'0 7 Although the results are not conclusive, it is
believed that this change in self-concept has a direct impact on
the delinquency rate. If you continually tell a child that he is a
criminal, and lock him up because of it, then eventually he will
begin to believe it.
The second major factor underlying the counterproductive na-
ture of institutionalization is the integration of status offenders
with harder delinquent offenders. Although some states abso-
lutely prohibit placing status offenders together with actual delin-
quents in state institutions, others prohibit only an initial
placement, but allow integration if the status offenders misbe-
106. Why Treat?, supra note 3, at 27.
Placing of such children in correctional institutions exposes them to asso-
ciation with more sophisticated delinquents who have committed serious
offenses and developed a pattern of delinquent conduct. Even more to be
condemned is the hardened adult criminals in jail detention and in adult
penal institutions to which some are committed or transferred as being in-
corrigible.
Id. at 27-28.
107. Culbertson, The Effect of Institutionalization on the Delinquent Inmates'
Self-Concept, 66 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 88, 93 (1975).
have. Many jurisdictions have absolutely no restrictions that
would prohibit the placement of PINS and delinquents in the
same facility. 108
The legislature of New York should be applauded for its initial
stroke of wisdom in prohibiting the placement of PINS in state
training schools. However, the legislators' sense of idealism was
not matched by their sense of fiscal generousity. Lack of avail-
able alternative dispositions for PINS prompted the temporary
use of state institutions to house status offenders. However, after
three years, the authorities abandoned the quest for alternative
placements due to insufficient allocation of funds by the state leg-
islature and it was again legal to incarcerate status offenders and
delinquents in the same overcrowded institutions. 10 9
The result of this placement structure is that today an over-
whelming proportion of the children confined by the juvenile
courts are those who have committed no criminal act. Yet, some
ninety-three percent of the nation's juvenile court jurisdictions,
which serve forty-four percent of the population, have no place to
send these children other than the county jail." 0 There, not only
are they confined with delinquent juveniles, but they are also
placed with hardcore adult offenders. It is now commonly ac-
cepted that contact with adult offenders, even on a casual basis
during mealtime or recreational periods, can undo any beneficial
effect that rehabilitative efforts directed toward the child may
have. 1' The impact of the child from constant association with
hardcore delinquent offenders is not surprising. Basically, we are
taking a rowdy, ill-mannered child and putting him in an institu-
tion where he can become versed in criminal skills from experts.
It is no wonder that many people closely involved in the operation
of juvenile centers refer to them as "institutions of Higher Educa-
tion in the Criminal Arts."
The third reason for institutional counterproductivity is the
108. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1108. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-68 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 16-1814 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ind. Ann. Stat. Code
§ 31-5-7-15 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1975).
109. Constitutional Right to Treatment, supra note 13, at 633-634. "Finally in
1968 the Legislature permanently amended the Family Court Act to allow place-
ment of PINS children in secure detention facilities, thereby invalidating the origi-
nal reform. L. 1968, ch. 874". Id. at 634 n.52.
110. Kalkin, Kramer & Human, Three Models of Juvenile Justice, 112 CRIM. L.
BULL. 165, 186 (March-April 1976). See JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN A FREE SOCIETY
158 (1973).
111. Chase, Questioning the Juvenile Commitment. Some Notes on Method and
Consequence, 8 IND. L. REV. 373, 383 (1974). "IT)he treatment contingencies are in
danger of being frustrated, on a daily basis, by the child's association with offend-
ers for whom different treatment modalities or, more likely, none at all are being
provided." Id. at 383-84. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 23.
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stigma associated with incarceration that attaches to the child.
This is due, in part, to the way the child views himself and the
manner in which society views him.
On the personal level, by labeling the child as "beyond control,"
or "in need of supervision," and by putting him behind locked
doors because of this, the court reinforces the child's negative
self-image and, in many cases, changes a rebellious youth, who if
only left alone would outgrow his tendency toward mischievious
conduct, into a full-fledged criminal."l 2 This is inexcusable when
the child has committed no crime in the first place.
Society also lends a hand in this stigmatizing process, espe-
cially in the case of status offenders. The public fails to make the
distinction between a child convicted of a criminal act and those
committed because of certain noncriminal acts they have per-
formed. On the contrary, it views them all as "juvenile delin-
quents" once they have been committed to an institution."l 3
There is nothing that even the best-intentioned rehabilitationalist
can do about it. The child is "punished" for the rest of his life de-
spite wishes to the contrary.
This stigma of delinquency is not something to be taken lightly.
In 1944, the Virginia Supreme Court warned that:
The stigma of conviction will reflect on him for life . . . It may, at some
inopportune, unfortunate moment, raise its ugly head to destroy his op-
portunity for advancement, and blast his ambition to build up a character
and reputation entitling him to esteem and respect of his fellow man.
1 14
The specific effects of this stigma are twofold. First, the stigma
of delinquency often precludes any potential rehabilitation and,
in fact, may encourage future delinquency."15 Second, it may
prove to be an onerous burden to the child in later life. It has
been demonstrated that an adjudication of delinquency (regard-
less of the charge) can make it difficult or impossible to find em-
ployment,116 obtain occupational licenses, 117 enlist in the armed
forces,1 18 and obtain public benefits. 119 In many respects, convic-
tion of a status offense can be just as damaging in later years as a
112. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1128-29. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 29, at 26; YALE PINS STuIY, supra note 11, at 1401.
113. ORLANDO & BLACK, supra note 5, at 19.
114. Id. at 20.
115. Id. at 20-21.
116. Id. at 22.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Why Treat?, supra note 3, at 28.
119. Id. at 28.
conviction for murder or rape.120 It is no wonder that a number of
these children are forced to lead a life of crime after release from
the institution. To quote the California Interim Committee on
Criminal Procedure: "If any of these "beyond control" children
were ever on the verge of committing a criminal act, they have
been brought to the right place for a final push."121
The obvious response to this counterproductivity argument is
that institutionalization is not the only alternative of the juvenile
judge. Clearly, the counterproductivity is strongest when the
child is committed. However, close examination of the evidence
leads this author to the conclusion that state intervention itself in
any compulsory manner is counterproductive. No matter where a
judge decided to send the child, the mere contact between the
child and the juvenile justice system has already produced im-
mense harm.
The degrading process of arrest and booking can be severly
traumatic for the young child, especially one who has committed
no criminal act. Any type of court adjudication, no matter how in-
formal, implies to the youth that he has been labeled as "undesir-
able" by society. Of course, the risks are at their peak when the
child is separated from his family, regardless of where he is
placed. Psychiatrists now recognize that "so far as the child's
emotional responses are concerned, interference with parental
ties, whether the psychological parent is "fit" or "unfit," is ex-
tremely harmful."'122 Removal of the child from the family envi-
ronment can result in serious psychological damage. Mere
interference with the home environment can produce the same
result. This damage is often more serious than the harm inter-
vention was supposed to prevent.123
The final unbearable stress that often ruptures the family may
be the act of state intervention by the juvenile court, even in
cases where the parents requested intervention. When a child is
swept from his home in a socially degrading fashion and kept
away from it against his will, the home is likely to close over him
like the formation of scar tissue. The child needs his own place in
his own home, however underprivileged and undesirable to others
that home may be. The state cannot supply the love that even a
woefully inadequate parents feels for his own child.124
Empirical research verifies this conclusion. A study conducted
120. ORLANDO & BLAcK, supra note 5, at 20.
121. CAL. ASSEMBLY, supra note 85, at 14.
122. BEYOND, supra note 79, at 31.34.
123. See BOwLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 13-20 (2d ed. 1965).
124. See Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 407
(1970).
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by Gold and Williams concluded that even apprehension encour-
ages rather than discourages delinquency.125 The study revealed
that the recidivism rate was higher when there was any form of
state intervention, from apprehension to institutionalization, than
if nothing had been done at all. The conclusion is thi t the impris-
onment of the status offender can serve no humanitarian purpose.
Rather, it is nothing more than punishment no matter what you
call it. The following facts concerning juvenile status offenders
makes this clear:
Juvenile status offenders are incarcerated as long as or longer than chil-
dren who are committed for rape, aggravated assault, and other felonies
classified as FBI "index crimes". The younger the offender, the longer is
the period of institutionalization. The classification for rehabilitation
lengthens the period of institutionalization and does not reduce the rate of
recidivism. Children with the longest institutionalization have the highest
rates of parole revocation.
1 2 6
A recent California Legislative Committee reports:
No one can prove that truants which become wards of the court end up
better educated than those who do not. No one can show that promiscu-
ous teenagers who are institutionalized have fewer illegitimate children
than those who do not. No one can show that runaways who become
wards of the court end up leading better, adjusted lives than those who do
not. Finally, no one can prove that unruly, disobedient minors who come
under court supervision end up in prision less often than those who do
not.
1 2 7
The disenchantment with the current system was best con-
veyed by Mr. Milton Luger, Commissioner of the New York Divi-
sion of Youth, which was later quoted in a judicial opinion: "With
the exception of a relatively few youths, it would probably be bet-
ter for all concerned if young delinquents were not detected, ap-
prehended or institutionalized. Too many of them get worse in
our care."'
128
3. Unnecessary
The third argument for the abolition of status offense jurisdic-
tion is that state intervention into the lives of status offenders is
unnecessary for the protection of the child.
125. ORLANDO & BLACK, supra note 5, at 21.
126. See OHIO YOUTH COMMISSION, A STATISTICAL INQUIRY INTO LENGTH OF STAY
AND THE REVOLVING DOOR, COLUMBUS, 1974.
127. See Board of Directors, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Juris-
diction Over Status Offenders Should Be Removed From the Juvenile Court, A Pol-
icy Statement, 21 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97, 98 (April 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Jurisdiction Removed].
128. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
It is not difficult to observe that the juvenile justice system con-
stitutes a serious threat to the personal liberty of status offenders.
Cases such as Gault129 and Kent13 0 make it clear that the value of
such liberty does not vary with age. Surely the right to walk
among the trees, take a drive in the country, or just do as one
pleases is no less precious to a seventeen-year-old than one of the
age of nineteen. It is also clear that children interjected into the
juvenile justice system have that liberty restricted. Regardless of
the label whether, punishment or rehabilitation, the loss of liberty
is basically a punitive measure to the child.13 1 No amount of
flowerly descriptives can change the reality:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, an ... indus-
trial school for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes a 'building
with whitewashed walls, regimented routines ... Instead of a mother and
father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is
peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and delinquents confined
with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
13 2
Regardless of the motivation and objectives, involuntary separa-
tion from family, compulsory committment to an institution, even
supervision of the child's activities by a probation officer, all
smack of punishment. Good intentions and a flexible vocabulary
cannot change this.
These involuntary restrictions on personal liberty are unneces-
sary for the protection of the child. Once the responsibility for
child-rearing is placed back in the family, they can do a far better
job than the state in raising their children. The shifting of respon-
sibility will also spur the development of voluntary community
programs to assist the child. The retention of jurisdiction by the
juvenile courts blocks these efforts. Judge David Bazelon, of the
United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, has said:
The argument for retaining beyond control and truancy jurisdiction is that
juvenile courts have to act in such cases because 'if we don't act, no one
else will.' I submit that precisely the opposite is the case; because you act,
no one else does...If the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to commit chil-
dren in such situations, the community would have to come up with a so-
lution. Neither the parents nor the community need to look for solutions
while the juvenile court is available. 1 33
Also, as has already been demonstrated, the child is better off if
there is no intervention at all. Thus, since the state can do the
129. In re Gault, supra note 26.
130. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
131. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH AND
DRUG ABUSE; LEG. DOC. No. 19, WHAT CHANCES FOR CHILDREN? A REPORT ON
WHAT HAPPENS IN NEW YORK STATE TO THE YOUNG IN TROUBLE, 27 (1970).
132. In re Gault, supra note 26, at 27.
133. Bagelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 42, 43-
44 (Summer, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Court).
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child no good and only harm him in the long run, the protection of
the child cannot justify further state intervention.
Second, status offense jurisdiction is unnecessary for the pro-
tection of society. Juvenile status offenders present no great dan-
ger to society. 3 4 Certainly institutionalization of these children is
not mandated in the name of societal protection. It is a common
belief now that delinquency will naturally decline with age with-
out state intervention and that state interference in the early
years of a child's life is not necessary to deter him from becoming
an adult criminal. A famous study of the Gluecks of Harvard Law
School indicated that the number of delinquencies decreased
with age and this decrease could be attributed to greater maturity
and a greater sense of responsibility on the part of the child
rather than to treatment. 135 In regard to status offenders, a Com-
mittee of the California Assembly reported:
Ambiguity in standards also leads many juvenile courts into handling
trivia. Well-adjusted youths who need no help whatever from the courts
typically at sometime or other while growing up get drunk, stay out late,
have sex, cut school or rebel against parental authority. If left alone, most
survive and become normal adults.1 3 6
Even if we assume that a smaller number of status offenders
are potentially dangerous to society, the present state of the art
holds little promise for an effective prediction of dangerousness
model.' 37 A major study of the effectiveness of prediction of de-
linquency conducted in Cambridge and Sommerville, Massachu-
setts, indicated an inability to predict accurately. In fact, the
predictions studied were wrong in more than fifty percent of the
cases.138 The prediction usually erred in favor of false positives
which meant unnecessary confinement for thousands of chil-
dren.139 Even if prediction is effective, there is still some concern
about detention on the basis of criminal potential. To many, the
concept itself is revolting. Where do we draw the lines? For what
potential acts do we confine and what degree of probability must
exist before incarceration is justified? These are all unanswered
134. Misbehaving Minors, supra note 40, at 191.
135. GLUECK & GLUECK, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS GROWN UP (1940). See also
SIMPSON, supra note 61, at 1005.
136. CAL. ASSEMBLY supra note 85, at 7.
137. TOBY, supra note 74, at 101.
138. POWERS & WITMER, AN EXPERIMENT IN THE PREDICTION OF DELINQUENCY
(1951).
139. Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can Violence Be Protected?, 18 CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY 393, 402 (Oct. 1972).
questions. The criminal justice system admits that preventive de-
tention is a monsterous evil. Why should it be any less so for
children?
Finally, the costs of incarceration are not justified by the results
if the goal is societal protection. Steven H. Clarke conducted an
extensive study on the crime-suppressing effects of removal of
the juvenile offender from society.140 This study only considered
the "removal effect" of incarceration, which is the effect of getting
the delinquent off the street by incarcerating him. (It should be
noted that it has already been shown that the preventive and re-
habilitative effect of juvenile incarceration is nugatory, thus the
removal effect would seem to be the only remaining justification
for imprisonment if the system really does not exist to punish.)
This study also included a population group of all committed
juveniles. Thus, the results are based on the total release of hard
and status offenders, something not advocated by this paper.
The study concluded that the cost of preventing one index
crime through institutionalization is conservatively set at $1100.141
Even more surprising was the conclusion that if all incarceration
of juveniles was completely eliminated, serious offenses commit-
ted by those under eighteen would increase by only five to fifteen
percent. 4 2 This translates into a one to four percent increase in
all index crimes.1 43 The study goes on to state that even if you
could double the number of juvenile offenders incarcerated, the
resulting decrease in nationwide FBI index offenses would be
only one to four percent. Considering the problems involved, the
benefits are not worth the cost.14 If releasing all juvenile offend-
ers, including the rapists and murders, from institutions has such
a small effect on the crime rate, then surely barring the imprison-
ment of status offenders, the least dangerous group of juveniles,
would reconcile the goals of individual liberty and allow society to
sleep safely at night.
4. Discriminatory
Fourth, the juvenile justice system operates in a highly discrim-
inatory manner. Few middle or upper-class children come into
contact with the juvenile court because of voluntary diversions to
140. CLARKE, supra note 84, at 527.
141. "It is assumed that the marginal cost of a nine-month incarceration is
about $1100. This figure includes four dollars per day for food, medicine, laundry,
and other variable costs, but does not include correctional personnel costs and
costs of law enforcement and juvenile courts." Id. at 531.
142. Id. at 532.
143. Id. at 532.
144. Id. at 535.
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private agencies.145 At the disposition stage, the voluntary insti-
tutions are filled with middle and upper-class clients and the
overwhelming majority of poor and minority children are sent off
to state institutions. Also, children with the most severe emo-
tional problems and thus the greatest treatment needs are cus-
tomarily rejected by voluntary agencies. Children from minority
and poverty backgrounds generally cannot meet the rigid stand-
ards set by voluntary agencies. The Committee on Mental Health
Services, in the current report, substantiated the existence of this
discriminatory policy. It concluded that the voluntary agencies
prefer the younger, female, white children from a "cooperative
family." The persistent runaway, fire-setter, or the child from a
broken home, will not be accepted in most cases. In 1971, over
seventy-five percent of white, female PINS were placed with vol-
untary agencies, while ninety-one percent of black, male juvenile
delinquents were placed in training schools.146 The same study
found that twenty percent of white delinquent boys were sen-
tenced to state institutions, while eighty-four percent of Puerto
Rican delinquents found their way into these dreaded places.147
Those that witnessed the television production of "Roots" and
were appalled at the treatment of blacks in this country, merely
need to visit a state juvenile institution to witness another en-
slavement of minority groups. A nation built on equality and jus-
tice cannot allow such a system to stand.
C. Radical Nonintervention Provides the Superior Policy
Option.
Adoption of a policy of radical nonintervention, which restricts
the coercive sanction of the juvenile court to conduct where there
is a specific violation of criminal statutes, would have significant
advantages. Such a policy has been advocated by such acclaimed
groups and individuals as the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 148 the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency,149 the Institute of Judicial
145. ScUn, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION, RETHINKING AND THE DELINQUENCY
PROBLEM, 56-57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NONINTERVENTION).
146. CONFOUNDED, supra note 49, at 23-25, 54-55.
147. Id. at 24.
148. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 29.
149. "Subjecting a child to judicial sanction for a status offense-a juvenile vic-
timless crime-helps neither the child nor society; it often does considerable harm
to both." Jurisdiction Removed, supra note 128, at 97.
Administration, in conjunction of the American Bar Associa-
tion,150 and Judge David Bazelon.151
This policy, like all other legislative policies, must be evaluated
on a cost-benefit analysis model. Clearly, a few status offenders
have reaped benefits from state intervention, however, such is not
the ground upon which policymakers decide the issue. It is nec-
essary to know the number of children harmed in the name of
helping those few and the extent of these benefits and harms in
order to make a proper decision. There are two compelling cost-
benefit arguments in favor of radical nonintervention.
First, on balance, radical intervention is better for the individ-
ual. We have already concluded that under the current system,
the child is better off if he is never apprehended since his chances
of leading a normal life decline as he becomes increasingly in-
volved with the juvenile justice system. Under a policy of re-
straint, emphasis would have to be placed on voluntary family-
based treatment programs since the option of intervention would
be nonexistent for the status offender.
Voluntary programs have traditionally been more effective in
deterring criminal activity than institutionalization because of the
noncoercive nature of the program itself.152 Parents and children
who are in conflict with each other, or with society, should cer-
tainly have community resources available to them, but the
choice to utilize these programs should rest with the family. The
primary responsibility must lie with the family unit. However,
even if family-based voluntary treatment programs are no more
effective than state intervention, their adoption is still suggested
because of the counterproductive impact of state interference.
Thus, even a system that totally abolished status offenses and
substituted nothing for them would be a superior alternative.
A second policy justification is that, on balance, radical nonin-
tervention is better for society. The gains of state intervention
into the lives of juvenile status offenders are clearly outweighed
by the cost. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency con-
cludes:
The benefits derived from such (status offense) classification for either
the child or society appear to be nonexistent. "It is unsettling ... to realize
that the number of recidivists is not only larger than one would reason-
ably expect, but also larger than if nothing had been done-larger than if no
delinquents had been incarcerated, had appeared before the court, or, in-
deed, had been caught at all." Weighing the costs of the status offender's
involvement in the juvenile court process persuades us that the jurisdic-
tion should be eliminated. In essence, the possible gains are not worth
150. See New Juvenile Justice Standards Proposed, 12 TRIAL 38 (Feb. 1976).
151. Beyond the Court, supra note 133.
152. Nonintervention, supra note 145, at 23.
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the risks.
1 5 3
What is frustrating is that most of the monetary costs are de-
voted to custodial aspects of the system, as opposed to those of
treatment. The state has become one of the biggest operators of
hotels and restraurants in the country (not that you would ever
choose to stay or eat in any of them). It now costs the state more
per year to incarcerate a juvenile ($5700) than to send him to col-
lege. About three-fourths of these costs are for non-rehabilitative
requirements such as shelter, food, clothing, etc. 154 The result of
granting jurisdiction over noncriminal behavior to the juvenile
courts is that a disproportionate share of available resources is
applied to youth who pose no criminal danger to society. With
the continued acceleration of juvenile crime, we can ill afford to
waste these meager resources.155 We cannot allow that money to
be spent on feeding and housing ill-behaved but harmless chil-
dren who should be cared for by their parents. Even if we must
subsidize the parents through our welfare system, that is argua-
bly a cheaper and more humane alternative.
If we feel compelled to retain the money in the juvenile system,
we could allocate it to improve the rehabilitative conditions in in-
stitutions to which we send delinquents or to enhance voluntary
community-based programs for disturbed children. Abolishing re-
habilitation as a basis for state intervention will not necessarily
eliminate all rehabilitative programs. This author's thesis is that
rehabilitation is objectionable as a justification for state interven-
tion. However, once a child is convicted of a criminal act, there is
nothing objectionable about entering him into a rehabilitation
program. Of course, one would not necessarily evaluate the pro-
gram against the standards of effective rehabilitation only.
Rather, the programs should be judged in terms of their "fair-
ness" and "humaneness" as well as their "rehabilitative" value.
Schur suggests that money spent on improving the quality of
life in the areas where the juvenile lives is likely to have a greater
effect on the delinquency rate than increased institutionaliza-
tion.156 The President's Commission agrees, noting:
The underlying problems are ones that the criminal justice system can do
little about .... Unless society does take concerted action to change the
153. Jurisdiction Removed, supra note 128, at 99.
154. Ketcham, The Changing Philosophy of the Juvenile Justice System, 20 Juv.
CT. JUDGES J., 63 (Summer 1969) [hereinafter cited as Changing Philosophy].
155. Jurisdiction Removed, supra note 128, at 99.
156. Nonintervention, supra note 145, at 104.
general conditions and attitudes that are associated with crime, no im-
provement in law enforcement and administration of justice . . . will be of
much avail. 15 7 Few could argue against the wisdom of eliminating delapi-
dated housing, ghettoes, of building new and more effective schools to pre-
vent the growth of delinquency. Money spent on such significant changes
in the environment produce greater rehabilitation benefits than an equal
dollar amount of individual psychotherapy, institutionalization, and proba-
tion counseling.
15 8
It should be noted that only a complete abolition of status of-
fense jurisdiction can deter resource squandering. If you allow
the court the option of a case-by-case determination of the suita-
bility of the child to status offense jurisdiction, then the option
will be widely utilized. Thus, the presence of an option to inter-
vene in "special cases" squanders legal resources in itself since
the result will require litigation of a great number of cases in or-
der to decide what circumstances are "special." Also, inevitably,
some status offenders will be committed and that result is unjus-
tifiable.
D. Practical Model.
Unlike status offenders, actual delinquents, especially those
committing serious crimes against persons and property, present
a serious and increasing danger to society.159 New York has ex-
perienced more than its share of this frightening increase.160 It is
clear that the oppressive treatment of PINS and the lax disposi-
tion of hardened offenders has caused a breakdown of the juve-
nile system in New York and has unleashed public outcry.16 1 The
legislature has attempted to deal with the serious juvenile of-
fender by enacting the New York Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
1976.162
The Act basically provides for less judge-discretion in the adju-
dication of juveniles accused of serious crimes. The important
changes introduced into the system through the Act consist of a
detailed record-keeping procedure at each stage of the proceed-
ing; the possibility of substituting a criminal prosecutor for the
county attorney as counsel for the petitioner; the introduction of
"the need for protection of the community" into the placement
decision; the curtailment of the wide discretion which the Proba-
157. Challenge, supra note 58, at 1.
158. Changing Philosophy, supra note 154, at 62.
159. Note, The New York Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976: Restrictive Place-
ment-An Answer to the Problem of the Seriously Violent Youth?, 45 FORD. L. REV.
408, 408 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Violent Youth].
160. In Nassau County, for example, 83% of all those arrested for major crimes
were youths. Id. at 408.
161. Id. at 408-09.
162. Law of July 26, 1976, N.Y. LAws.; see also Violent Youth, supra note 159 (for
an excellent discussion of the operation of the Act and an analysis of its impact).
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tion and Division for Youth currently possess over the processing
and disposition of juveniles accused of serious violent crimes; and
the imposition of continuity in judicial supervision.163
Statutory schemes such as the one suggested by the New York
Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 would have an excellent inter-
face with a policy of radical nonintervention. The elimination of
status offense jurisdiction allows the juvenile court to concentrate
its efforts and resources on juveniles who commit serious of-
fenses. A system such as this responds, to some extent, to the de-
mands for reform from advocates of mishandled youth and the
demands of a frightened and outraged community.
There is'a general consensus among interventionalists and
noninterventionalists regarding the need for changes in the way
we deal with serious juvenile offenders. 64 Most radical non-
interventionalists have little quarrel with a juvenile system that is
based upon deterrence and punishment. Even those who feel
that there is some potential for rehabilitation can be accomo-
dated. Once a child commits a criminal act and is convicted by a
system that grants him all due process safeguards, he has for-
feited his unrestricted right to liberty. Once he is in the system, it
is permissible to attempt to rehabilitate him. All that is argued is
that it is impermissible to deprive a child of freedom solely on the
basis of rehabilitation.
It is not clear whether harsher treatment of the juvenile crimi-
nal will have any appreciable impact on the crime rate. However,
it is not subject to attack on the same grounds as status offense
imprisonment.
Therefore, the juvenile court's jurisdiction should be limited to
those offenses which have counterparts in adult criminal law. The
juvenile would have all due process procedural rights extended to
him. Additionally, there should be an increase in the number of
community-based treatment programs which would be offered on
a voluntary basis.
Physically abused children should be handled through neglect
proceedings, coupled with criminal prosecutions of the parents.
Standards for state intervention in neglect cases would be deline-
ated and strictly enforced.165 The main purpose of this provision
163. Violent Youth, supra note 159, at 419-20.
164. Id. at 425-26.
165. See WALD, supra note 30 (for an example of a set of standards for state
intervention in neglect cases and an analysis of their justification and operation).
would be to prevent the juvenile court from utilizing its neglect
jurisdiction to retrieve its status offense jurisdiction. (There
would also be a strictly enforced rule against institutionalization
for neglected children.) The philosophy of radical noninterven-
tion would also be introduced into the "neglect" proceedings
through a strong statutory presumption against removal from the
home.
Obviously, there are a multitude of objections to a policy of rad-
ical nonintervention. Many of those rest on the ground that po-
tential rehabilitation is a justification for confinement. These will
be summarily dismissed on the basis of the previous discussion
and others will be dealt with briefly.
First, it is suggested that radical nonintervention prevents the
court from removing a child from a "undesirable" home environ-
ment. However, as previously noted, the state cannot improve
this situation and, most probably, will worsen it. Even though a
few isolated cases might benefit, the employment of an "on-bal-
ance" criteria demands rejection of the option.
Second, some are concerned with physically abused children.
The battered child is indeed a serious problem and one that
shocks the conscience. However, this is an ideal case for the invo-
cation of the court's neglect jurisdiction along with utilization of
the court to prosecute the parents. Finally, the beatings in state
institutions are often far worse than those at home and thus make
committment undesirable.
Third, there is a notion that unification of the criminal and juve-
nile systems will expose many young soft-offenders to hard-core
adult criminals. That is often the situation now. However, chil-
dren could be segregated under the system suggested here. By
reducing congestion in these facilities, that goal becomes obtaina-
ble.
Fourth, critics assert that the elimination of status jurisdiction
will preclude the enforcement of truancy laws. Initially, institu-
tionalization seems an inappropriate remedy since it almost guar-
antees that the child will become educated in the criminal
sciences. Further, the enforcement of truancy laws deters few
children from missing school. If necessary, an attempt could be
made to utilize voluntary programs to motivate the child into at-
tending class. But even if these programs do not succeed, the
child is probably in a better position without an education than
being a product of the juvenile justice system.
Fifth, a fear is expressed by some that radical nonintervention
will prevent the enforcement of anti-liquor and tobacco laws.
Some speculate a society of alcoholic, chain-smoking minors.
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Their fears are unjustified. It is illegal in most states for adults to
sell those items to children. Thus, the adult sellers can be prose-
cuted if the problem is serious. Also, the most serious concern
about alcohol is that the minor will drive under the influence.
That will remain a criminal act both for adults and children. Ad-
ditionally, this seems to be a parental matter which requires pa-
rental discipline, not state coercion. Finally, it is questionable
that the law deters those children who occassionally want alcohol
from procuring it.
E. Conclusions.
The steadfast support of status offense jurisdiction presents a
classic case of "don't bother me with the facts" syndrome. It now
appears that state intervention in the lives of juvenile status of-
fenders is inherently ineffective, counterproductive, unnecessary,
and discriminatory. Any one of these indictments should be suffi-
cient to warrant its abolition. The price we pay in terms of
wasted lives and squandered resources is just too high.
The juvenile system is one plagued with discretion. Public pol-
icy would not allow a case-by-case determination of when inter-
vention is permissible in the case of a status offender, even if
meaningful standards could be formulated. It would be too easy
for the minority of bad judges to carelessly ruin the lives of our
children. However bad judges are not the problem. This author is
convinced that juvenile court judges are extremely well-inten-
tioned people. Those intentions are the root of the problem. If
one cultivates a system that repeatedly communicates to judges
that they possess this mystical power through which they can,
with a wave of the hand, save a child from a life of crime, they
eventually come to believe it. What is needed is a total revamping
of this attitude and the structures of the juvenile justice system.
If society questioned a status offender upon release from one of
those "dungeons of dispair" known as a state juvenile institution,
it is unlikely that he would thank society for its efforts. Perhaps,
after seventy-seven years, we can come to realize that enough
lives have been destroyed and enough money wasted. We cannot
make it up to those children, but we can help those who are yet to
come.
II. THE LEGAL AVENUE
A. The Role of the Lawyer.
The lawyer in the juvenile court system is torn between two
goals. On one hand, as he is accustomed to operating as an advo-
cate in an adversary system, he feels compelled to protect the lib-
erty of his client. On the other hand, however, he is told that the
juvenile system is based on the notion that state intervention is in
the "best interests of the child." As such, his role is to work with
the courts to find the best disposition for his client. Given these
conflicting philosophies, it is no wonder that the juvenile justice
process often has difficulty in attracting high-grade legal talent
and even those lawyers who enter the system are not sure what
to do once in it. To say that the role of the lawyer in the juvenile
system is unclear is a paramount understatement.
Given the fact that contact with the system cannot help the sta-
tus offender and will most probably scar him for life, the role of
the attorney defending this subgroup of the juvenile population
should be clear. His function should be to argue strenuously to
keep the child from the possessive clutches of the juvenile proc-
ess. As long as the court maintains status offense jurisdiction, it
is often only the child's lawyer that can stand between him and
those cold gray walls of some juvenile institution. In some cases
this will necessitate separate counsel for the child and the par-
ents since their interests are often conflicting in a PINS adjudica-
tion.
Any discussion of the utilization of lawyerly skills to keep a cli-
ent out of confinement normally begins with procedural protec-
tions. Many of the procedural safeguards applied to adults have
been extended to children.166 However, the list is not complete.
The extension of all due process rights to children seems a sensi-
ble course of action, given the fact that children, in many cases,
are deprived of their liberty after disposition for longer periods
than adults. However, full due process guarantees are not a com-
plete solution. The accomplishment of legal safeguards for
juveniles at the trial level will still leave a significant number
committed to institutions.167 This is especially true for status of-
fenders, given the vagueness of the statutes.
Perhaps a promising avenue for the lawyer defending an ac-
166. See In re Gault, supra note 26 (right to counsel, privilege against self-in-
crimination, cross-examination of witnesses); see also, In re Winship, supra note
27 (determinations of delinquency require proof beyond a reasonable doubt); see
also, Kent v. United States, supra note 131 (due process applies to juvenile pro-
ceedings).
167. MALMQUIST, supra note 14, at 160.
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cused status offender would be the development of PINS de-
fenses resembling, but not identical to, standard criminal
defenses. Most lawyers are more than willing to apply these de-
fenses in cases of accused delinquency since they are often
viewed as junior criminal trials. In status cases, however, lawyers
tend to be less willing to assert them since the charge usually in-
volves intrafamily and school conflicts.168 A lawyer trained in
standard criminal law may find it difficult to find a relationship
between these offenses and any form of traditional legal defense.
The result is that few defenses to PINS charges have been devel-
oped and asserted.
The second reason for the deficiency of PINS defenses is that
attorneys, as a group, are not familiar with the functions and op-
erations of the juvenile court. Lawyers, for all practical purposes,.
did not enter the field at all until 1967.169 Many of those that did
enter were engulfed in the ideals of rehabilitation and refused to
assert defenses vigorously. Other lawyers, particularly the older
ones, actually sided with the parents against the child. Another
group disregarded the wishes and desires of their client and the
juvenile system and substituted their own judgement. The result
was that few status offenders had any form of meaningful legal
defense.
Third, even though some lawyers may be qualified to defend
PINS, usually the status offender will not be able to relate to the
lawyer and thus be of little assistance in preparing his defense.
The lawyer typically comes from a middle-class background. The
status offender more often than not comes from both a minority
and low socioeconomic background and, generally, is distrustful
of a stranger in a three-piece suit.170 PINS often do not speak
English or are inarticulate, fearful of discussing family matters
with a stranger, or can even be emotionally disturbed or re-
tarded.17 ' The result is that a lawyer must invest an inordinate
amount of time to elicit facts necessary to assert a defense in a
process closely akin to "teeth pulling." Even if he manages to find
out the relevant information, he often feels that the child would
make such a poor witness that his own testimony, despite its
168. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1131-32.
169. There were a few jurisdictions that guaranteed the juvenile legal counsel
before Gault. See In re Gault, supra note 26 at 37 n.36, 38-41.
170. Challenge, supra note 58, at 56-57.
171. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1136.
evidentary importance, would only work against him. It is not
surprising that most PINS defense attorneys waive the fact-find-
ing hearing.172
A fourth reason behind the scarcity of PINS defenses is the
lack of any formal adjudication hearing in most cases. 173 In the
common case, the child admits the act and then is quickly hustled
off to the disposition stage where the court is only concerned with
the best possible treatment. Although there is a hearing at this
stage, defenses such as parental misconduct or provocation will
not go to the issue of incorrigibility, as it has already been de-
cided, but only to placement. 174 The raising of such issues can
work against the child at this stage, since in some cases it will vir-
tually guarantee his removal from the family.
Finally, the refusal to develop and advance defenses for PINS is
sometimes a tactical decision, although probably based on a
faulty assumption. Some lawyers are convinced that if they by-
pass the adjudication hearing, especially in cases where the child
has committed the act of which he is accused, the judge will treat
the child more favorably at the disposition stage. This is based on
the premise that the admission of wrong is the child's first step to
rehabilitation and that the juvenile judge will consider this fact.
This is also largely because most attorneys in the juvenile court
have acquired their experience in the adult criminal court process
where in some jurisdictions up to ninety percent of all cases
never go to trial but are disposed of through a plea-bargain agree-
ment.175
Several changes in the process could be initiated to make it
more difficult to subject status offenders to the juvenile justice
system. The first would be the guarantee of a full and formal ad-
judicatory hearing in the case of all PINS. Coupled with this pro-
vision would be a prohibition against waiver, so that the child will
not be pressured into quickly admitting his "guilt." The major ob-
jection to this introduction of formality is that it could impede the
rehabilitative effect. Since we have seen little rehabilitation ac-
company the present informality, it is questionable that anything
will be lost with added formality. On the contrary, the confronta-
tion between the parent and the child at the adjudicatory hearing
can in fact be therapeutic if properly handled.
172. Id. at 1136-37.
173. Stiller & Elder, PINS- A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 33, 39 n.35 (1974).
174. For example, in Oklahoma it is recognized by statute that a child may be
adjudicated a PINS even though he is the victim of parental misconduct. OKLA.
STAT, ANN. tit. 10 § 1116(a)(1). (Cum. Supp. 1975).
175. Challenge, supra note 58, at 134-35.
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It is doubtful that the courtroom confrontation between parent and child
can cause any more harm to their relationship than the injury that has al-
ready occurred by virture of the parent's bringing the juvenile to court
and charging him or her as a PINS. The child plainly knows that but for
the parent's charges, he or she would not stand accused. Eliminating pa-
rental testimony against the child at an adjudicatory hearing or excusing
the child from the courtoom during such testimony by the parent may in-
deed be more detrimental to the child than allowing the juvenile to hear
the parental accusations, since the allegations imagined by the child may
generate more anger and be more frightening to the youth than the
charges that are actually made. 1 7
6
The hearing may provide the first meaningful opportunity for dia-
logue between the parent and child in a neutral environment with
an impartial arbiter.177
Increased formality, in itself, may deter parents from filing "be-
yond control" petitions against their child. The informality of the
probation intake procedure leads parents to believe that it can
mold the court disposition to fit their desires as they can normally
do with the probation intake process. 7 8 Because of this, parents
sometimes feel that they have nothing to lose by filing a incorrigi-
bility petition, since they will be able to dictate the outcome in a
"wrist-slapping" manner. The parents are often shocked to learn
that once the child is adjudged a status offender, the parents'
wishes are often ignored and the judge now decides the fate of
the child.179 A formal adjudicatory hearing, with sworn testimony
and cross-examination, will put the parents on notice early that
they will not be able to reverse an unwanted disposition once the
process begins and may deter them from filing or at least cause
them to tone down their accusations.1 80
The requirement of cross-examination may also deter parents
from filing a beyond control petition, especially in marginal cases.
Such cross-examination will often expose parental inadequacies
and misbehavior which the parents would rather not have re-
vealed in court. Even if the parents do file, cross-examination will
generally impede the making of general and vague accusations
176. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1141 n.185.
177. It may be argued that asking a juvenile court judge to act as a neutral arbi-
ter in such a situation is too demanding because it forces him to act as a psychia-
trist and a social worker, as well as a judge. The observation is often made,
however, that such a role is not to be avoided by the judge, since it strengthens
the unique quality of the juvenile court in our justice system. See Rebellious Son,
supra note 15, at 1141 n.187.
178. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 11, at 1395.
179. Rebellious Son, supra note 15, at 1139-40.
180. Id. at 1140.
that lack factual support.' 8 '
Finally, the hearing may bring out facts regarding parental in-
discretions or misbehavior that could either warrant dismissal of
the charges, or a more favorable disposition for the child. Of
course, it could also work against the child. Only the trial lawyer
can decide if the introduction of these facts can help the child's
cause.
Once we have a formal adjudicatory hearing in PINS cases, law-
yers representing accused status offenders should vigorously as-
sert defenses such as failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies,
contributory neglect, as well as defenses based on strict adher-
ence to statutory requirements. Perhaps some of the standard
criminal defenses could prove helpful in some incorrigibility de-
fenses as well as a form of the de minimis defense for trivial con-
duct. Stocking the arsenal of legal weapons for the juvenile
defense attorney may serve to keep some children out of state ju-
venile institutions.
The cost of such a system will be a massive drain on legal man-
power, including both lawyers and judges. Every child accused of
a status offense will have to be represented by counsel to make
these changes meaningful. Since few of these children can afford
legal services, the state will most likely be forced to underwrite
the cost. In most cases, the parent's attorney cannot adequately
represent the parents and child since their interests do not nor-
mally coincide in PINS proceedings. There might be an ethical
problem even if the parents offered to pay for the child's lawyer.
The child would be no worse off under a more formal system
that emphasized the adversarial role of the lawyer. A review of
the evidence indicates that the child does not receive a more
favorable disposition if he pleads guilty.182 In many cases, the
child receives a harsher placement. A formal fact-finding proce-
dure will, at least prevent the child from feeling that he was "rail-
roaded" into the juvenile institution. Irene and Yale Rosenberg of
the University of Houston School of Law state that "Insistence on
a fact-finding hearing may instill in the child positive feelings to-
ward the judical process, whether or not the result is dismissal of
the charges."183
When the child is confined on the basis of a pressured admis-
181. Id. at 1140-41.
182. "[T] he seemingly attractive rationale that a child can insure institutional
benefits by making an admission is simply not supported by the facts. Although a
defendant in a criminal court may admit guilt in return for a reduced sentence,
there is no counterpart to this plea bargaining in the juvenile court system." Id. at
1139.
183. Id. at 1143.
[Vol. 6: 639, 1979] Radical Nonintervention
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sion, he feels that the state has unjustifiably intruded into his life
in an arbitrary fashion. This is true even if the lawyer attempts to
explain to him the effect of his plea. 8 4 He views the process as
punishment for his honesty. If, however, his conviction is sus-
tained after a full formal hearing where his attorney has asserted
defenses in his behalf, the child is more likely to understand that
it is his conduct that the state disapproves of, not his honesty.
Juveniles generally appreciate the presentation of their side of
the story even if they disagree with the finding of the court.185
The introduction of increased procedural formality will probably
not advance rehabilitation in itself, but it could reduce some of
the alienation that young status offenders are bound to feel to-
ward the judicial system and toward society.
Another avenue of attack available to the juvenile defense at-
torney is to argue that placement of the child is improper on
grounds of fairness and statutory compliance. Several appellate
courts have held that the committment of status offenders to state
institutions, absent a strong showing of cause, amounted to an
abuse of the trial court's discretion.186 Some of the committments
of PINS to state institutions appear to be outside of the statutory
framework and are susceptible to attack on those grounds.
An evaluation of these proposals involving formality in the ad-
judication and disposition stage of PINS proceedings is difficult.
The result will most probably be reduction in the number of sta-
tus offenders committed to juvenile institutions. But the price, in
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1143-44.
186. See In re M, 332 N.Y.S. 2d 125 (1972) (where the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, modified a Family Court disposition in which a person in need
of supervision who violated his probation was committed to a state training school,
rather than being placed in a suitable drug rehabilitation program). See also, In re
M, 338 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (1972) (where the same court held that a PINS, who is not
charged with any delinquent conduct, should not be placed in a state training
school "unless all other reasonable means of placement have been fully investi-
gated and exhausted"). In re C, 337 N.Y.S. 2d 936 (1972); (reversed), C v. Redlich,
347 N.Y.S. 2d 51 (1973) (The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, af-
firmed a court disposition of a 15 year old youth, adjudged to be a person in need
of supervision, after all efforts to place him in alternative settings had failed. The
court decided that "unfortunately" the state training school was the only suitable
environment for the child. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and held that
"proper facilities must be made available to provide adequatc supervision and
treatment for children found to be persons in need of supervision..."); In re Peters,
188 S.E. 2d 619 (1972). (The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that commit-
ting a status offender to a state school is inappropriate where the evidence dis-
closed that he disliked school and had absented himself from school.)
terms of legal resources, may be high. Any plan which will keep
our children free from the influences of the juvenile justice sys-
tem is probably worthwhile, although a legislative policy of radi-
cal nonintervention would be a superior course of action.
Hopefully, increasing the difficulty of institutionalization proceed-
ings through procedural safeguards and more vigorous assertion
of defenses will deter utilization of the system by parents.
B. The Right to Treatment.
Presently, it is commonly accepted that juveniles deprived of
their freedom, especially status offenders, enjoy a constitutional
right to treatment.187 To provide a blow-by-blow description of
the history of this right appears unnecessary. Generally, the ana-
lytical basis for the right is found in one of two theoretical justifi-
cations. The first is the eighth amendment concept that
confinement without treatment constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.188 The second justification involves a higher stan-
dard based on due process and equal protection. 18 9 The treat-
ment is quid pro quo for confinement and, absent treatment,
confinement becomes philosophically and practically untenable.
It would seem better to base future right to treatment contentions
on due process grounds since an eighth amendment theory only
guarantees improvement in physical conditions up to some un-
specified minimum. Due process attacks are best suited to insure
meaningful treatment to juveniles.
Clearly, advocates can utilize the right to treatment theory to
improve the conditions in institutions that status offenders are
committed to. However, it is not readily apparent that such an
approach is desirable. The right to treatment up to this point has
not been successfully invoked to keep status offenders out of in-
stitutions completely. The issue is whether the theory can be
used to keep a significant distance between juveniles and juvenile
institutions.
In Part I, evidence was presented to the effect that the most ef-
fective treatment programs center on family participation.190 In
line with this contention, several commentators have suggested
that, as to status offenders, the right to treatment includes the
187. For an excellent and up-to-date analysis of the case law formulating this
right in both the areas of juvenile delinquency and civil committment, see, Brown,
The Right to Treatment Under Civil Committment, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE
COURT JUDGES (1975); See also, Note, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 1051, 1054-57 (1975).
188. STONE, supra note 37, at 87.
189. Id. at 88.
190. THOMAS, supra note 93, at 78.
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right not to be removed from the home environment. Professor
Gough of the University of Santa Clara Law School explains:
[A] child is affected-and there "treated"-from the moment of his induction
into the juvenile court system and his categorization as a person over
whom the system has jurisdiction. I have attempted to suggest that the
right to treatment, in the case of one whose behavior presents no commu-
nity danger and does not contravene the criminal law, subsumes a para-
dox-namely, a right not to be treated unless there is a positive likelihood
of that treatment yielding beneficial results; and I would here argue for its
extension to include a right not to be improperly categorized. Among
other things, this would preclude the adjudication of a child as incorrigible
or beyond the control of his parents without an affirmative showing that
his parents have attempted to exert controls in a reasonable and proper
way .... Second, the right to treatment posits the making by the court of
a dispositional choice best suited to the amelioration of the presenting
conditions. In some cases, if not in many, the right to treatment will re-
quire that the court decline to assume jurisdiction when its jurisdiction
will not be adjuvant to the child or when its intervention will exascerbate
parental dysfunction. More specifically, since incorrigibility cases by defi-
nition reflect family disruption, and since a growing body of clinical evi-
dence points to the conclusion that therapy directed to correction of that
unruly behavior must be oriented to the family as a whole, the right to
treatment for the beyond control child will most frequently mean a right
not to be removed from that setting in which the corrective therapy must
be carried out-the family. 19 1
Henry Foster and Doris Freed stated that: "A child has a moral
right and should have a legal right ... to receive parental love
and affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow to maturity in
a home environment which enables them to develop into a ma-
ture and responsible adult .... -192
Thus, implicit in the concept of the right to treatment should be
a strong presumption in favor of parental autonomy.
The formulation and implementation of stringent standards for
judicial intervention will further the child's right not to be re-
moved from his family environment. Vague status offense stat-
utes increase the likelihood that the court will intervene in
instances where a child will be damaged by the intervention. The
lack of clear statutory standards allow the decisionmaking to be
deferred to the ad hoc analysis of judges and social workers.
Often on the basis of their own personal biases, they remove a
child from a home where, if left alone, he would have developed
normally. Short of radical nonintervention, we should at least de-
mand that these individuals make their decisions on the basis of
specific harms that will result to the child if left alone. Another
191. Beyond Control, supra note 41, at 194-95.
192. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972).
possible approach would be through a statutory presumption that
committment to a state institution is inherently more damaging
than total nonintervention in the absence of special circum-
stances. It would then be incumbent on the state to justify its ac-
tions.
Despite the emergence of the "right to nonintervention" theory
as early as 1971, no state has fully adopted its principles. A few
have suggested that the youth has a right to family-based pro-
grams,193 but no court has gone as far as saying that committment
is void in the absence of exhaustion of all possible alternatives
(including nonintervention). The theory, while its net result is
appealing, contains certain analytical flaws. In theory, its claim
that it is an extension of the judicially created "right to treat-
ment" after committment, as such, is unsound. The eighth
amendment justification for the right to treatment cannot be ad-
vanced here, since we can only improve institutional conditions
under this notion. It is unlikely that any court would hold that
state intervention itself constitutes "cruel and unusual punish-
ment."194 The due process claim is also weak. The standard ap-
plication of due process to the juvenile treatment case is that
treatment is the quid pro quo for incarceration under the parens
patriae theory. Before one can demand treatment, there must be
some form of coercive incarceration. It would thus be difficult to
utilize the right to void the incarceration from its inception since
treatment is dependent on the. confinement.
There are two possible theories that could sustain the "right to
nonintervention." First, the right to treatment cases could be
read as mandating the best treatment for the child, something
which the courts have explicitly refrained from doing. Since
home-treatment is best suited for the status offender, then it is
mandatory, or so one argues under the right to treatment cases.
Second, one could also maintain that the right to treatment is the
threshold quid pro quo for any form of state intervention,
whether it involves confinement or not. As such, it comes into
play at the moment of initial contact between the child and the
system. As a result, by the time this status offender arrives
before the judge, he has already earned his release since that
would be the best treatment possible. No due process "right to
treatment" case has extended the right this far. The development
193. "Failure to allow and encourage full participation of family and interested
friends in the program of a youthful offender constitutes a violation of the juve-
nile's state and federal right to treatment." Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 116
(E.D. Tex. 1973).
194. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (for a discussion of the cri-
teria for "cruel and unusual punishment").
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and implementation of such a theory seems absurd in that it cre-
ates a perpetual "revolving door" of arrest and release. However,
it is one possible avenue to pursue if one is committed to a "right
to treatment" approach.
C. Criticism of the Right to Treatment.
The conditions in most juvenile institutions are horrendous and
thus this author would support any program that minimizes
youth contact with it, or at least improves existing conditions.
However, the real question is what is the most effective and effi-
cient system to accomplish that goal. In the absence of reason-
able alternatives, a right to treatment approach to improve the
treatment facilities in our juvenile institutions should be imple-
mented. I would also advocate it as a short-term solution as we
make the transition to radical nonintervention. However, this au-
thor is convinced that, in the long run, it is not desirable to
restructure the present juvenile justice system. Lawyers tend to
look for legal solutions, viewing due process as some doctors view
penicillin. However, often legal solutions are not the best, and
could even compound this problem. The full-scale implementa-
tion of the right to treatment, in the sense that the courts have in-
terpretated it in cases from Martarcella v. Kelley195 through
Nelson v. Heyne,196 would be plagued with severe problems and
would clearly be inferior to a policy of radical nonintervention.
An initial objection to the reliance of the right to treatment in
the juvenile area is that it fortifies the medical model, which, as
already indicated, is inappropriate to juvenile delinquency. The
focus of the entire system becomes even more misdirected. Basi-
cally, the status offender, with a few exceptions, is not "sick." The
word "treatment" itself implies some sort of medical solution. Of
course, an undesirable effect of this terminology is that although
the juvenile may not need treatment, the child may come to be-
lieve that he is "sick" and become mentally ill because of the pre-
scription of the institution where he is sent.19 7 Another problem
is that although the child receives treatment, since the child is
195. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), ordered 359 F. Supp.
478 (S.D.N.Y., -1973).
196. Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1973); arid, 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir. 1974); cert. denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
197. Note, Treatment for Juveniles, 1973 WASH. L.Q., 157, 191 (1974).
suffering from no known "disease," 198 there is no existing treat-
ment for the status offender, except confinement itself. Incarcera-
tion becomes the "cure."'199 The courts will be hesitant to order
nonexistent treatment since the order would be difficult to
phrase.200 No case can be found where the court demanded more
than the presently available treatment.201 As a result, the right to
treatment will, in reality, only be applied in a few situations
where some treatment is clearly identifiable. In other cases, com-
prised mostly of status offenders, the courts will probably look to
the conditions of confinement and if they are reasonable, confine-
ment will continue. At best, the status offenders are placed in
cleaner institutions under this approach. A few may even be re-
leased by judges disgusted with the juvenile system. Of course,
the label carried by those released under this theory will not be
pleasant, since society and the child may feel that he was only set
free because he was too "sick" to be helped by medical science.
Second, the right to treatment is a piecemeal solution. At best,
a few children are set free or improvements are made in the qual-
ity of a few institutions. Given the vast burden on the legal proc-
ess, it is unrealistic to expect a wholesale restructuring of the
juvenile justice system through this approach. This is largely be-
cause individualistic solutions mandate failure. Theoretically, the
treatment of juveniles is to be applied on an individual basis and
the right to treatment will probably be applied in a similar man-
ner. Unless we are able to utilize the right to exclude a large
group of children from the juvenile process at a single time, we
are forced into an ad hoc system which is tremendously ineffi-
cient and probably ineffective. Unless the mandate can be carried
out in terms of probability of groups, it is doomed to failure. The
"right to nonintervention" seems plagued by this objection since
it seems to make blanket evaluations of committment, which is
something the courts, under the present philosophy, will do on
only an individual basis.202
Third, to the extent that the right to treatment improves the
quality of life in juvenile institutions, unless some stringent ad-
mission limitations are enacted, there will be an exaggeration of
198. Other than perhaps being children, which is a fairly common "ailment" in
children.
199. MALMQUIST, supra note 14, at 179.
200. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456-57 (U.S. App. D.C., 1966) (where
the court expressly limited the 'right to treatment' to treatment that is "adequate
in light of present knowledge").
201. "At no point does it appear that the courts have given effectuation to a
claim for optimum treatment, nor for treatment which is curative in fact." Beyond
Control, supra note 41, at 185.
202. Id. at 199.
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demand. As parents see the conditions in state training schools
approaching those of private agencies or even of the family home,
they will have a greater incentive to file a "beyond control" peti-
tion. The result may be that more children are committed to less
horrendous places. 2 03 Of course, as the institution population in-
creases, conditions will again degenerate, perhaps to lower levels
than those currently existing.
The fourth problem with the right to treatment approach is that
the vast bulk of status offenders are not represented by counsel
or are defended by inexperience attorneys.204 To make the right
meaningful would require the appointment of qualified lawyers
for all status offenders at public expense. Not only would this
amount to a squandering of lawyer-time that might be better uti-
lized in another area, it would also involve massive allocations of
judges away from delinquency cases where they are vitally
needed. Judges would also have to continuously supervise juve-
nile institutions to insure compliance with their treatment orders.
It is questionable whether society would be willing to bear such
costs, and even more dubious if they should. Radical noninter-
vention would produce equal or better results without the im-
mense costs.
Not only would a right to treatment approach waste legal re-
sources, it would also squander societal resources. The improve-
ment of juvenile facilities is an expensive proposition. With
radical nonintervention, we could reduce overcrowding and spend
the resources on children who have been adjudged delinquent. It
would also be possible, and perhaps wiser, to fund projects that
will renovate the ghettos, improve education, or provide voluntary
community services to troubled families. One thing is certain: we
could not do worse with the money.
A sixth objection to the right to treatment theory is that it only
guarantees a minimum level of care. All that the courts have re-
quired is a "good-faith" effort.20 5 There is really no assurance that
status offenders will be given treatment distinguishable from that
accorded hardened criminals. Coupled with this problem is the
reality that the formulation and enforcement of meaningful stand-
203. See generally, Manella, The Case for Residential Treatment of Delinquent
Children, 25 JUv. JUST. 2 (May 1974).
204. Couch, Diverting the Status Offender From the Juvenile Court, 25 JUv. JUST.
18 (November 1974).
205. Rouse v. Cameron, supra note 200, at 456.
ards presents a difficult task. An objective standard seems hope-
less given the complexities of the subject matter.206 A subjective
standard will force the court to deal with very complex medical,
psychiatric, psychological, and sociological theories. Although the
courts could probably perform this task, it would require the ex-
penditure of a great deal of judicial time. If the courts only re-
quire "some sort" of treatment, then the constitutional right to
treatment is rendered a nullity since almost any institutional pro-
gram could be defended as a form of treatment.20 7 In short, once
we confine the child to a juvenile institution, he is forced to play a
dangerous game of russian roulette, where some win, but most
lose.
With a policy of radical nonintervention, we are not forced to
premise incarceration on rehabilitation. As such, we only have to
apply eight amendment criteria to juvenile institutions which are
far easier to formulate and enforce.
Seventh, the right to treatment without adequate funds is an at-
tempt to cut through the substance in order to reach the proce-
dure. It is unclear that legislatures will be willing to allocate the
funds necessary to upgrade treatment programs to acceptable
levels. Even if they do, the monies will most likely come from
other social programs which are urgently needed.
The expenditure of public funds on improving juvenile institu-
tions without limiting their admissions may also be undesirable
because it will entrench the state in the "hotel and cafe" busi-
ness. The state should get out of the business of providing custo-
dial care to juveniles, which involves the majority of the cost of
institutionalization, and place that burden on the parents where it
belongs. In many cases, the right to treatment merely forces the
state to upgrade their "Motel 6" into a "Holiday Inn."
The ninth objection to the full-scale adoption of the right to
treatment is that it could lock-in current levels and methods of
treatment and impede the development of community programs.
Once an institution meets judicial levels of care, it may become
inflexible and fail to adopt new treatment procedures, especially
if the institution is forced to obtain prior court approval of each
new method. Also, since the courts would be defining institu-
tional treatment in constitutional language, this would tend to
perpetuate institutional treatment. This could have the undesir-
able effect of discouraging experimentation in community and
family-based rehabilitation programs 20 8 and could also deter pre-
206. Juveniles, supra note 92, at 187.
207. Id. at 188.
208. Juveniles, supra note 92, at 190-91.
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vention through improvement in social condition programs since
the institutions would siphon most of the funds. The right to
treatment could guarantee that juvenile institutions are here to
stay.
Finally, the costs of improving the system through the legal ave-
nue of the right to treatment outweigh the gains by a considerable
degree. As discussed in Part I, treatment is inherently ineffective
and counterproductive. Spending more money provides cleaner
institutions with volleyball and shuffleboard courts but, no matter
what name is given them, they are still jails that deprive children
of one of their most fundamental rights, the right to be free. A
policy of radical nonintervention that insures a child's liberty un-
til he commits a criminal act is clearly superior to one that merely
provides him with a more attractive room once committed.209
III. CONCLUSIONS
One thing is clear. A purely legal solution to the problem of
status offender jurisdiction will prove ineffective. 210 What is
needed is the eradication of the rehabilitative model as a justifica-
tion for incarceration. Once we rid ourselves of parens patriae, it
is not necessary to utilize the right to treatment philosophy. We
can attempt to "treat" delinquents if we feel it wise or humane,
but we should be under no moral obligation. Although this ap-
proach may seem harsh, it is anything but that. Under this sys-
tem, no child would be subjected to the evils of the juvenile
justice system until he has been accused and proven guilty of
criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt and has been af-
forded full due process safeguards.
It is time to refrain from using our legal system to enforce pa-
rental normative judgements on our children at the price of their
liberty. Edwin Schur, one of the foremost advocates of radical
nonintervention, states this proposition as follows:
Policies should be adopted, therefore, that accept a greater diversity in
youth behavior; special delinquency laws should be exceedingly narrow in
scope or else abolished completely, along with preventive efforts that sin-
gle out specific individuals and programs that employ "compulsory treat-
209. A solution of radical nonintervention is responsive to individual needs
while "a purely legal solution... would nullify the rehabilitative nature of the ju-
vehile process by imposing social sanctions upon one who does not require them,
or withholding treatment from one who needs it." KIrrE, supra note 95, at 860-
61.
210. See generally, Beyond the Court, supra note 133.
ment." For those serious offenses that cannot simply be denied away
through a greater tolerance of diversity, this reaction pattern may para-
doxically increase "criminalization"- Uniformly applied punishment not
disguised as treatment; increased formalization of whatever juvenile court
procedures remain in order to limit sanctioning to cases where actual anti-
social acts have been committed and to provide constitutional safeguards
for those proceeded against.2
1 1
A discretionary system that allows the option of confining sta-
tus offenders invites abuse and wastes legal and societal re-
sources in trying to combat the abuse. The costs of a legal
solution to this problem outweighs the gains and is far greater
than the price of a policy of radical nonintervention.
Let the next parent's cries that the state take his child fall upon
deaf ears. Next year, over 20,000 children who have committed no
crime will be scarred for life as a result of sentencing to juvenile
institutions.
211. Nonintervention, supra note 148, at 23.
